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Information security deals with the protection or preservation of six key aspects of 
information, namely, confidentiality, integrity, availability (CIA), authenticity, 
accountability, and non-repudiation. Considering organizations’ ever-increasing 
dependence on information systems for operational, strategic, and e-commerce 
activities, protecting information systems against potential threats to the organization 
has become a major concern for governmental policy as well as business corporations. 
In this paper, an extensive literature review of information security background, 
barriers to sound information security, and traditional measures to address information 
security are presented to serve as a solid foundation for further researches. The pros 
and cons of each method introduced are analyzed. Besides, this paper makes a 
meaningful attempt to establish an empirical econometric model in order to 
investigate the effect of government enforcement on hackers’ behaviors using event 
study methodology. In addition, panel data estimation (specifically, the fixed effects 
model) is also employed to further illustrate the results given by the event study 
analysis. Our results demonstrate that government enforcement has a significantly 
negative and deterrent impact against hackers’ behaviors by dramatically reducing the 
number of security attacks committed either for an individual country or at a global 
level. It complements the existing body of research in the realm of information 
security by incorporating an important variable - government enforcement - and 
contributes, to some degree, to the establishment of a more sophisticated model of 
information security. In addition, our results also provide valuable policy as well as 
economic implications.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
In the current ICE (Internet Changes Everything) Age, there is a growing consensus 
that information technology (IT), especially the Internet, is altering the way we live, 
work, communicate, and organize our activities (Laudon and Laudon, 2005). The 
Internet has provided companies as well as individuals with tremendous economic 
benefits, including dramatically reduced costs and enhanced productivity. However, 
the use of the Internet has also significantly increased potential vulnerabilities of 
organizations to a stream of new threats such as viruses, worms, hackers, information 
thefts, disgruntled employees, etc (Gordon and Loeb, 2002). According to a 2002 
survey conducted by the Computer Security Institute and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (CSI/FBI), 90% of the respondents detected computer security breaches 
within the last twelve months and the average loss was estimated to be over $2 million 
per organization (Power, 2002). Besides, a 2005 CSI/FBI survey also revealed that 
website incidents had increased radically and that virus attacks remained to be the 
source of the greatest financial losses (Gordon et al., 2005). Other slightly informal 
surveys by Ernst & Young point out that 75% of businesses and government agencies 
have suffered a financial loss due to security breaches, 33% admit the lack of 
capability to respond, and nearly 34% of the institutions are incapable of identifying 
security threats within the organization (Insurance Information Institute, 2003). The 
terrible information security situation is also highlighted by Symantec Internet 
Security Threat Report (2005) - the number of new bot1 variants remains to climb. 
For example, referring to Figure 1.1, in the current period, 6,361 new variants of 
Spybot2 are reported to Symantec, which is a 48% increase over the 4,288 new 
variants documented in the second half of 2004. In addition, many high profile 
                                                        
1 Bots are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s computer in order to allow an unauthorized user to 
control the computer remotely. 
2 Spybot is one common form of bots, which is known to exploit security vulnerabilities. 
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corporations such as Microsoft, eBay, and Amazon.com have suffered large-scale 
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, causing these companies inaccessible for a significant 
period of time (Gohring, 2002). Furthermore, some crackers have deliberately 
tarnished the websites of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of 
Defense (DoD), and the U.S. Senate (Vogel, 2002). But to make matters worse, the 
actual situation may be even worse. Based on several reports, many of the companies 
are reluctant to report security breaches to shareholders due to potential negative 
reputation and publicity, and the security breaches estimated might be the tip of a very 
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Figure 1.1: The Number of New Bot Variants 
 
Considering the pervasive Internet risks discussed above and organizations’ 
ever-increasing dependence on information systems for operational, strategic, and 
e-commerce activities, protecting information systems against potential threats to the 
organization has become a critical issue in handling information systems. In other 
words, information security is a crucial issue of and major concern for governmental 
policy as well as business corporations (Whitman, 2003). Information security is not 
only an enabler of business, but also a critical part of organizations. Continuous 
information security maintenance is the lifeblood of organizations especially in the 
current ICE Age (Dhillon, 2006). And the preservation of confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of information from both internal and external threats within the 
organizations is vital to the successful operation of the businesses as well as 
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governments. Accordingly, it is urgent and essential that organizations take strict 
measures to establish information security policies and procedures that adequately 
reflect the organizational context and new business processes so as to guarantee the 
successful functioning of the organizations.  
 
Given the adverse situation of information security, the chief information security 
officers (CISO) of organizations are making non-trivial investments in information 
security to help safeguard their IT assets from security breaches. Besides, 
expenditures on investment in information security by institutions has been on the rise 
with an annual rate of 17.6% and the amount is predicted to approach $21.6 billion in 
2006 (AT&T, 2004). However, the outcome is far from satisfactory and information 
security level has never improved (Whitman, 2003). Therefore, it is natural for 
scholars and practitioners to seek to address the following issue concerning 
information security: “What factor or factors have an effect on hackers’ behaviors?”. 
However, from the perspective of social research, it is almost impossible to answer 
such “what” question correctly and perfectly, since incorporating every aspect about 
the determinants poses a huge task for the researchers. Our paper tries to tackle the 
problem by proposing a specific research question as follows.  
 
Information security is an issue of important concern to organizations as well as 
governments, and many researchers have been engaging in this dynamic and 
promising field. However, while prior researches provide important insights into the 
behaviors of various parties in the field of information security, nearly none of them 
directly focuses on the effect of government enforcement or even touch this area. The 
goal of our paper is to fill this void by focusing on one factor that has been, to the best 
of our knowledge, untouched yet in former researches and shedding light on the 
following research question: “What is the impact of government enforcement against 
hackers’ behaviors?”. This question spawns two streams of research: (1) Whether 
government enforcement encourages or discourages hackers to launch malicious 
attacks on the victims, and 2) Is there any significant effect of government 
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enforcement on hackers’ behaviors.  
 
In this paper, we address the effect of government enforcement against hackers’ 
behaviors by employing event study methodology - an approach widely used in 
finance and economics. We first adapt event study analysis to our situation, then 
conduct it for every country in the country list, and assess the respective effect within 
each country. Our results suggest that government enforcement has a significantly 
negative and deterrent impact against hackers’ behaviors by dramatically reducing the 
number of security attacks launched by other hackers, which has important 
implications for policy making that deals with information security.  
1. 2 Organization of the Paper 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives formal 
definitions of information security, introduces interacting agents, and presents barriers 
to sound information security. In Chapter 3, an extensive literature review is 
conducted on traditional measures to address information security issues with 
emphasis on behavioral aspects and economic approaches. The Pros and cons of each 
method are also analyzed. Some meaningful researches are identified and empirical 
results are analyzed in detail in Chapter 4 using both event study methodology and 
panel data estimation (the fixed effects model). Chapter 5 wraps up our discussion 
with a summary and concluding remark. Appendix A provides a list of countries’ 
abbreviations. Appendix B shows the detailed list of events for the eight countries 
under investigation.  
 
The objective of this paper is to review the field of information security as the 
groundwork for further research and serve as a guide for the solution of problems that 
have not been addressed. In addition, we will also conduct an empirical analysis with 
real-world data to investigate the effect of government enforcement against hackers’ 
behaviors using both event study methodology and panel data estimation.  
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Chapter 2 Information Security 
2.1 Formal Definition 
Information security is by no means a new and innovative concept, and the need to 
safeguard information against malicious attacks is as old as mankind (Hoo, 2000). 
Currently, information security has changed from the preservation of physical 
locations and hardware to the inclusion of soft-side aspects such as information, data, 
etc.  
What is Information Security 
The definition of information security used here is adopted from the concept 
formulated by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST, 1995). 
Information security deals with the protection or preservation of six key aspects of 
information, namely, confidentiality, integrity, availability (CIA), authenticity, 
accountability, and non-repudiation.  
Confidentiality: Confidentiality is defined as the protection of private data and the 
prevention of disclosure or exposure to unauthorized individuals or systems. 
Confidentiality is aimed at ensuring that only those with authorized rights and 
privileges to access information are able to perform so, and that those without are 
prevented from accessing it. When unauthorized users can have the access to the 
information, confidentiality is endangered and breached.  
Integrity: Integrity means the prevention of unauthorized modification of information, 
and the quality or state of being whole, complete, and uncorrupted. This indicates that 
only authorized operators of systems can make modifications. The integrity of 
information is at stake when it is exposed to corruption, damage, destruction, or other 
disruption. Confidentiality and integrity are two very different concepts. In terms of 
confidentiality, the question is usually posed as “Has the data been compromised”. 
But as for integrity, we evaluate the reliability and correctness of data.  
Availability: Availability deals with preventing unauthorized withholding of 
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information or resources. In other words, availability guarantees authorized users can 
access information anytime they want, do so without interference, and receive it in the 
correct and desirable pattern. The frequent occurrence of popular DoS attacks is 
mainly attributable to this aspect of information security not being sufficiently 
addressed.  
 
With the rapid expansion in the theory and practice of information security, the C.I.A. 
triangle calls for a combination of other parameters.  
Authenticity: The quality or state of being genuine or real, instead of a reproduction 
or fabrication.  
Accountability: The defining and enforcement of the responsibilities of the agents 
(Janczewski and Colarik, 2005).  
Non-Repudiation: The property which prevents an individual or entity from denying 
having performed a particular action related to data or information (Caelli et al., 
1991).  
 
In short, the objective of information security guarantees that during the procedures 
of data processing, transmission, or storage, the information is always available 
whenever it is required (availability), only to those authorized users (confidentiality), 
and cannot be modified without their authority (integrity). It also means that the user 
is ensured to use the data in an authenticate representation (Janczewski and Colarik, 
2005). There is also a term called computer security, which is a little bit similar to 
information security. However, we should make explicit the difference between them. 
The former covers issues only limited to the electronic data processing environment, 
while the latter deals with more than these issues and includes the whole organization. 
For example, information security is concerned with the approach paper documents 
are stored or processed, while computer security is not.  
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2.2 The Interacting Agents 
Generally, the realm of information security involves four groups of agents that 
interact with each other - hackers, end-users, software vendors, and security 
specialists. Since most people are quite familiar with end-users and software vendors, 
we plan to focus on illustrating the other two categories of agents, namely hackers and 
security specialists.  
2.2.1 Hackers 
Not all hackers are malicious as most people expect. On the whole, hackers can be 
divided into two general classes: white hat hackers and black hat hackers (Leeson and 
Coyne; Schell and Dodge, 2002).  
White Hat hackers are also known as the good hackers. Although these hackers 
break into computer systems without legal rights or privileges, they do not have 
malign intentions to compromise the systems and voluntarily share security 
vulnerabilities to help create a good information security environment with those who 
are in charge of the systems, such as network administrators, CERT/CC, etc. White 
hat hackers can be further roughly divided into the following three categories (Schell 
and Dodge, 2002):  
• The Elite who are the gifted segment, recognized by their peers for their 
exceptional hacking talent.  
• CyberAngels who are the so-called “anti-criminal activist” segment of the 
hacker community patrolling the web to prevent malicious attacks.  
• The White Hat Hacktivists who strive to promote free speech and 
international human rights worldwide by constructing websites and posting 
information on them, using the Internet to discuss issues, forming coalitions, 
and planning and coordinating activities.  
Black Hat hackers are also called the bad hackers. In contrast to white hat hackers, 
these groups of hackers use exploits to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or 
accessibility of the system for a variety of motivational factors such as peer 
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recognition, profits, greed, curiosity, etc., and pose great threats to information 
security. However, many security experts have proposed that “hackers are not a 
homogenous group” (Sterling, 1992; Post, 1996; Denning, 1998; Taylor, 1999). And 
hackers, even black hat hackers, are too broad to be helpful for in-depth researches. 
Rogers (1999) is among one of the first few security researchers who proposes a new 
taxonomy for black hat hackers, which categorizes them into seven groups including 
Tool kit/Newbies (NT), cyberpunks (CP), internals (IT), coders (CD), old guard 
hackers (OG), professional criminals (PC), and cyber-terrorists (CT). These categories 
are considered as a continuum from the lowest technical ability (NT) to the highest 
(OG-CT).  
• Tool kit/Newbies are novices in hacking and have limited amounts of 
computer and programming skills. They often rely on published software or 
exploits conducted by mature hackers to launch the attacks.  
• Cyberpunks have better computer and programming skills compared with 
Newbies, and are intentionally engaged in malicious acts, such as defacing 
web pages, sending junk mails (also known as spamming), credit card theft, 
and telecommunications fraud.  
• Internals consist of disgruntled employees or ex-employees who are quite 
computer literate and may be involved in technology-related jobs before. The 
most terrible aspect is that they have been assigned part of the job; therefore, 
they can launch the attacks easily and even without detection.  
• Old Guard Hackers have high levels of computer and programming skills 
and seem to be mainly interested in the intellectual endeavor. Although they do 
not intend to compromise the system, there is an alarming disrespect for 
personal property from this group (Parker, 1998).  
• Professional Criminals and Cyber-terrorists are probably the most 
dangerous groups. They possess advanced computer and programming skills, 
master the latest technology, are extremely well trained, and often serve as 




Most of the academic researches have centered on cyber-punks, and little attention has 
been focused on other classes (Rogers, 1999). Again, it should also be noted that not 
all hackers are detrimental to the society. Although many black hat hackers exploit 
security vulnerabilities out of various motivations, we should also look at the other 
side of the coin. In many cases, the compromise of systems can actually help establish 
more effective security infrastructure in the future, thus preventing other hackers from 
launching further attacks. Thus, Schell and Dodge (2002) argue that “hackers 
represent one way in which we can help avoid the creation of a more centralized, even 
totalitarian government. This is one scenario that hackers openly entertain”.  
History of Hacking 
After discussing the different classifications of hackers, the history of hacking is 
introduced next, which implies a constantly changing hacker label (Hannemyr, 1999). 
The term hacker was coined and presented in the 1960s at the outset of the computer 
age. Initially, it implied the most capable, smart, competent, and elite enthusiasts 
mainly in the field of computers and software (Levy, 1984). Since then, hackers have 
undergone approximately four generations of evolution (Voiskounsky and Smyslova, 
2003). The first generation of hackers involves those who actively engaged in 
developing the earliest software products and techniques of programming. The second 
generation is involved in developing PCs and popularizing computers. Those who 
invented popular computer games and brought them to the masses are classified as the 
third generation. With the development of technology, especially the Internet, the 
meaning of hacker has changed dramatically. Due to the successive occurrences of 
information security breaches (Computer Crime & Intellectual Property Section, 2006) 
and the exaggerated demonization of the media against hackers (Duff and Gardiner, 
1996), the term hacker currently carries negative implications of computer criminals 
and virtual vandals of information assets (Chandler, 1996). Taylor (1999) 
characterized the fourth generation of hackers as those “who illicitly access others’ 
computers and compromise their systems”. In addition, many researchers now hold 
the viewpoint that “modern hackers are just pirates, money and documentation 
stealers, and creators of computer viruses” (Taylor, 1999; Sterling, 1992) and “hackers 
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are a national security threat and a threat to our intellectual property” (Halbert, 1997). 
In conclusion, the term hacker has transformed dramatically from positive images 
mainly referred to as “white hat” hackers into negative connotations chiefly 
representing “black hat” hackers.  
2.2.2 Security Specialists 
In the field of information security, security specialists mainly include CERT® 
Coordination Center (CERT/CC) (Png, Tang, and Wang, 2006), which is “a center of 
Internet security expertise, located at the Software Engineering Institute, a federally 
funded research and development center operated by Carnegie Mellon University”3. 
The objective of CERT/CC is to work as a third-party coordinator that conducts 
extensive researches on information security vulnerabilities, helps develop and 
establish a sound information security environment, and serves as a bridge between 
software vendors and end-users. The typical sequence of events concerning CERT/CC 
can be described as follows: A white hat hacker might first identify a system 
vulnerability in the software and then report it to CERT/CC. After receiving the report, 
CERT/CC conducts careful researches to investigate the severity of the vulnerability. 
If it may pose severe threats, then CERT/CC will notify the concerned software 
vendors of the vulnerability and provides them with a certain period of time (generally 
45 days) to offer patches or workarounds. After the period expires, CERT/CC will 
issue public advisories, which provides technical information about the vulnerability 
and patch information that enable users to take preventive actions and protect their 
systems against potential malicious attacks.  
2.2.3 Overall Sequence of Events 
The overall sequence of events involving the four groups of agents can be best 
illustrated by Figure 2.1 (Png, Tang, and Wang, 2006).  
 
                                                        






























Attack ○3  




Figure 2.1: Sequence of Events 
2.3 Barriers to Sound Information Security - Insufficient 
Incentives 
A review of the literature (e.g., Anderson, 2001; Varian, 2000; Kunreuther and Heal, 
2003; Camp and Wolfram, 2000, etc.) indicates that the major culprit to information 
insecurity results from insufficient incentives. Anderson (2001) is among the first 
few security experts who put forward the innovative idea - “information insecurity is 
at least as much due to perverse incentives”. At present, after an extensive literature 
review, we classify the main reason - insufficient incentives - into four main 
categories that pose as barriers to sound information security.  
2.3.1 Negative Network Externalities 
Negative externalities4 occur when one party directly imposes a cost to others without 
any compensation. Consider, for example, the following scenario: In a computer 
network composed of 100 users who can choose whether or not to invest in 
information security, if others are active to invest in security, then you may also 
benefit the enhanced security generated from positive externalities; therefore, you 
                                                        
4 A good introduction to network externalities is presented by Shapiro and Varian (1999).  
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might prefer to be a “free rider”, and choose not to invest in security and save money. 
On the other hand, if others are reluctant to invest in security, then the incentive for 
you to do so is greatly diminished, since the computer network often assumes a 
“friendly” internal environment and only protects external attacks instead of viruses 
coming from the internal network, and a smart hacker can attack and compromise all 
the other computers via some unprotected ones. “The overall security of a system is 
only as strong as its weakest link” (CSTB, 2002). It seems that, in a computer network 
now prevalent in the real world, the issue of information insecurity cannot be 
eliminated thoroughly no matter whether or not users invest in security. Kunreuther 
and Heal (2003) first proposed the issue of interdependent security (IDS), and 
developed an interdependent security model to address the incentives of investing in 
security. The central theme in their paper is that when all the agents are identical, two 
Nash equilibria exist - either everyone invests in information security or no one 
bothers to do so, and under such circumstance, only stipulating that everyone should 
invest in security can enhance social welfare, which can resolve the above dilemma.  
Kunreuther et al. (2003) further points out that when there are a large number of 
identical agents ( ) and none of the others has invested in security, then 
investing in computer security for the remaining one agent is by no means a dominant 
strategy in Nash equilibrium provided that the cost of protection is positive.  
∞→n
 
Another potential harm caused by negative externalities in information security is 
rooted in the large installed base of the products involved. Just as a coin has two sides, 
in spite of great benefits of enhanced compatibility and interoperability, a large 
installed base can also attract a considerable amount of malicious attacks, thus 
rendering the consumers more vulnerable to security breaches both within and outside 
the organization (Rohlfs, 1974). Malicious black hat hackers prefer to attack systems 
with a large installed base due to higher market share and thus greater economic 
payoffs to exploit potential vulnerabilities. Accordingly, by participating in a larger 
network, an individual or firm encounters higher security risk despite enhanced 
compatibility and interoperability. That is the reason why most hackers have an 
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unrelenting enthusiasm to launch attacks towards Windows-equipped machines 
(Honeynet Project, 2004; Symantec, 2004).  
 
To address the issue of negative externalities, governments can try to force the firms 
involved to internalize the externalities in the following ways:  
(a) Requiring firms to buy security insurance in case of possible security breaches, 
which is also related to an attractive research field - cyber-insurance;  
(b) Stipulating that software vendors should be responsible for the low-security 
products, and computer owners and network operators be held accountable for 
the financial losses caused by the security breaches via their computers to third 
parties;  
(c) Providing governmental financial supports such as public subsidies to those 
who invest in information security to further motivate them to contribute to a 
sound security environment.  
 
However, not all the above approaches are feasible and efficient. For example, the 
second way is too expensive to enforce because of high transaction costs to 
determine the liability party as well as the culprit of the losses - the identification of 
the cause might sometimes take several months or even years (Kunreuther and Heal, 
2003). But, anyway, the above points establish a solid foundation for further 
improvements, and their efficacy needs to be empirically tested in the real world.  
2.3.2 Liability Assignment 
The second cause of insufficient incentives resides in deficient or ill-defined liability 
assignment. Consider, for instance, the following scenario: A black hat hacker 
discovers a security vulnerability at site A to attack via network operated by B through 
Internet Service Provider (ISP) C, which compromises the information in the D’s 
computer. Then who should be responsible for the security breach? No one is willing 
to hold accountable for it. This is called inadequate “liability assignment” (Varian, 
2000). Similar situations are ubiquitous in the real world. In the field of information 
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security, the liability is also so diffuse, thus rendering the large quantity of 
information security breaches. For example, since software vendors are not held 
accountable for the low quality and security of the products, they tend to shift the 
burden to their consumers without any loss and do not bother to improve security. 
Another example is related to some high profile websites that have been attacked by 
malicious hackers via unprotected and compromised computers. Although the system 
operators or computer owners do not intend to participate in the attacks, they 
indirectly help the hackers to commit criminal actions and even do not bear the costs 
of the attacks. The two examples illustrate the same idea: the parties involved do not 
have sufficient incentives to protect the information security due to ill-defined liability 
assignment.  
 
To address the issue, Varian (2000) argues that one of the fundamental principles of 
the economic analysis of liability is that it should be assigned to the party that can 
perform the task of managing information security in the most efficient manner. A 
more concrete approach is to assign liability in two ways: (a) System operators and 
computer owners should be liable for the financial losses caused by malicious attacks 
via their computers to third parties such as denial-of-service to high profile websites, 
and (b) Software vendors should be held responsible for their low-security products. 
An alternative method is to “allocate a set of vulnerability credits” to every individual 
machine and create tradable permits just like the way used in pollution (Camp and 
Wolfram, 2000). Other potential solutions for addressing liability assignment include 
establishing insurance markets to handle security risks and requiring firms to buy the 
cyber-insurance (Blakely, 2002). However, some controversies exist concerning who 
should be liable for security breaches (Fisk, 2002; Camp and Wolfram, 2000). To 
make matters worse, legal systems do not fully address the liability party in terms of 
computer security either. Up till now, U.S. case laws have not yet explicitly clarified 
who should shoulder the responsibility for financial losses when IT security is 




Of course, someone who has learned “The Coase Theorem5” might claim that in the 
absence of transaction costs, an efficient outcome exists no matter how allocations of 
properties are assigned. However, the most important premise - no transaction cost - is 
almost impossible to fulfill in the real world. In dealing with security incidents, 
determining the liability parties involved generally entails substantial time and efforts 
- high transaction costs. Therefore, when this precondition is not satisfied, the Coase 
Theorem fails to provide any promising direction for governmental policies in this 
setting.  
2.3.3 No Accurate Measures of Information Security 
Another reason why there are insufficient incentives in protecting information 
security results from the dearth of accurate measures of good information security. 
Today, the information security market is actually a “market for lemons6” in the sense 
that evaluations of product security are blurred by consumers’ inability to distinguish 
secure products from insecure ones, thus leading to little incentives to increase the 
security of the products (Anderson, 2001; Blakley, 2002). The situation is further 
aggravated by software vendors’ strong motivations to incorporate many attractive 
features but often possibly including some new vulnerabilities (European Union, 
2001).  
 
To address the issue, a large quantity of metrics have been proposed to measure 
information security, such as Annual Loss Expected (ALE), Security Savings (S) and 
Benefit (B) (Hoo, 2000), Investment Return: Return on Investment (ROI) (Blakley, 
2001) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) (Gordon and Loeb, 2002), etc. However, all 
of the above measures have some limitations, which will be discussed in detail in the 
next chapter. A relatively innovative measure is presented by Schechter (2004), who 
uses the market price to identify a new vulnerability (MPV) to measure security 
strength. Although this method can be used to establish a vulnerability market and 
                                                        
5 Interested readers can refer to Coase (1960) for a detailed explanation of the Coase Theorem, and can also read 
Frank (1999) for a brief introduction.  
6 For a detailed idea of “the market for lemons”, readers can refer to Akerlof (1970).  
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improve information security, Ozment (2004) argues that Schechter fails to consider 
some fundamental problems such as expense, reputation, and copyright infringement, 
and “the expense of implementing the vulnerability market is not trivial”.  
2.3.4 Other Barriers to Information Security 
In addition to the above three barriers, other obstacles to information security should 
by no means be neglected.  
 
First, a couple of empirical studies (Ackerman, Cranor, and Reagle, 1999; Westin, 
1991) have reported that consumers place high values on privacy. However, some 
recent surveys and experiments (Chellappa and Sin, 2005; Hann, Hui, Lee, and Png, 
2002) have pointed out the obvious “dichotomy between privacy attitudes and actual 
behaviors” (Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005) - many consumers are willing to trade off 
privacy for small rewards such as $2 or a free hamburger, which poses a great threat 
to information security, since once hackers obtain consumers’ personal information, it 
is quite easy for them to launch attacks such as identity theft.  
 
Second, considering that the probability of security breaches is relatively low, 
consumers might find that security safeguards will bring about functional problems 
such as declining convenience, slow speed, etc. Besides, many consumers might 
prefer to purchase the products focusing on attractive features instead of enhanced 
security, that is, to trade off security for functionality.  
 
Third, many firms just do not report information security breaches, since they fear it 
will endanger their reputation or publicity. Actually, concealing such facts does 
nothing but hampers the establishment of sound information security. It is no wonder 
for Pfleeger (1997) to argue that “the estimated security breaches might be the tip of a 
very large iceberg”.  
 
Finally, although home security benefits exceptionally from regression models, 
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information security cannot use similar models to measure security risks. The 
underlying reasons are as follows: (a) Information systems are much more “complex 
and heterogeneous than homes”, and (b) The relationships between independent 
variables and dependent variables are dynamic rather than static (Schechter, 2004). 
Therefore, although both information security and home security belong to the 
category of security, the former cannot use traditional regression models to measure 
security risk unless we can successfully isolate the dynamic factors from static ones.  
 
In conclusion, the following paragraph is presented to wrap up this section of barriers 
to sound information security. Anderson (2001) concludes “the real driving forces 
behind the security system design usually have nothing to do with such altruistic goals. 
They are much more likely to be the desire to grab a monopoly, to charge different 
prices to different users for essentially the same service, and to dump risk”. In 
addition, economics often serves as an efficient as well as effective weapon to 
properly align incentives. Therefore, we have the firm conviction that economic 
approaches should be promoted and employed to address the issue of information 
















Chapter 3 Traditional Measures to Address 
Information Security 
In Chapter 1.1, we have illustrated in detail the motivations to implement information 
security. In addition, Chapter 2.3 presents the challenges to maintaining sound 
information security atmosphere. Therefore, it is urgent for us to take some preventive 
measures to address information security. An extensive literature review points out 
three main directions of research endeavor, namely, technological approaches, 
behavioral aspects, and economic approaches to information security. Since this paper 
mainly deals with economic aspects of information security, technological approaches 
to address security are introduced in brief, just as a refresher introduction.  
3.1 Technological Approaches 
At first, information security was considered as a pure technological issue which 
simply called for technical defense. Under such circumstances, a large branch of 
researches and a large number of research papers have centered on the design and 
implementation of security technology. Technical solutions, if properly implemented, 
are able to maintain the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information 
assets. Technical defense includes firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), dial-up 
protection, scanning and analysis tools, content filters, trap and trace, cryptography 
and encryption-based solutions, access control devices, etc (Whitman, 2003; Dhillon, 
2006). Among these techniques, encryption-based solutions, access control devices, 
IDS and firewalls aimed at safeguarding information security attract the largest 
amount of attention from security experts (e.g., Wiseman, 1986; Simmons, 1994; 
Muralidhar, Batra, and Kirs, 1995; Denning and Branstad, 1996; Schneier, 1996; 
Pfleeger, 1997; Larsen, 1999). Although technological approaches were once “hailed 
as the magic elixir that will make cyberspace safe for commerce” (Varian, 2000), 
Anderson (1993) argues that most of the ATM frauds involve human errors, and they 
are caused by implementation errors or management failures rather than deficiencies 
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in cryptosystem technologies. In other words, simply relying on technical defense 
alone, it is still hard to properly address information security due to insufficient 
incentives, and we should also employ the powerful economic tools - microeconomics 
- to better align economic incentives in order to establish sound information security.  
3.2 Behavioral Aspects 
In addition to technological approaches discussed above to addressing information 
security, researches on behavioral aspects to diminish security breaches have been 
developing rapidly (e.g., Straub, 1990; Niederman, Brancheau, and Wetherbe, 1991; 
Loch, Carr, and Warkentin, 1992; Straub and Welke, 1998; August and Tunca, 2005).  
 
A promising and significant research direction involves the exploration of 
motivational factors relating to hackers. As early as in 1994, Schifreen (1994) 
proposed five motivational factors that pushed hackers to conduct hacking activities, 
which included opportunity, revenge, greed, challenge, and boredom. Taylor (1999) is 
probably the earliest comprehensive publication that investigates hackers’ motivations, 
which presents that hackers’ motivations are categorized into six main groups: 
feelings of addiction, urge of curiosity, boredom with the educational system, 
enjoyment of feelings of power, peer recognition, and political acts. While 
acknowledging Taylor (1999)’s contributions, Turgeman-Goldschmidt (2005) 
challenge that none of these motivations is closely related to the hackers’ mental 
product. Thus, he argues that hackers’ accounts instead of their motivations should be 
examined to further extend the understanding of hacker community. The hackers’ 
accounts reported by the interviewees in his study are presented in the following 
descending order of frequency: 1) Fun, thrill, and excitement, 2) Curiosity for its own 
sake - a need to know, 3) Computer virtuosity, 4) Economic accounts - ideological 
opposition, lack of money, monetary rewards, 5) Deterrent factor, 6) Lack of 
malicious or harmful intentions, 7) Intangible offenses, 8) Nosy curiosity and 
voyeurism, 9) Revenge, and 10) Ease of execution. Furthermore, the author indicates 
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that fun, thrill, and excitement is fundamental to all the other accounts due to the fact 
that all of them rely on it. For example, the second point - curiosity - can be 
interpreted as the fun of discovering, knowing, and exploring. The author’s use of 
hackers’ accounts is a creative extension to Taylor (1999)’s work because it enables 
researchers to comprehend how people perceive themselves within their own cultural 
context and serves as an interpretive structuring of reality of hacker community 
(Turgeman-Goldschmidt, 2005). A conceptual theoretical model is developed by 
Beveren (2001) to describe the development of hackers and their motivations. Its 
selling point is to use the flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1977, 1990, 1997) construct to 
present important variables that network operators and website designers can employ 
to deter and prevent malicious attacks in daily operations if the hypotheses proposed 
are supported by empirical studies. 
 
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the social foundation that enables hackers 
to evolve into a unique social group, Jordan and Taylor (1998) explore the nature of 
the hacking community by focusing on two aspects: internal factors and external 
factors. The internal factors involve six elements: technology, secrecy, anonymity, 
boundary fluidity, male dominance, and motivations. The six components mainly 
interact with each other among hackers, and equip them with a common language and 
a variety of resources hackers can utilize to communicate, recognize, and negotiate 
with each other within the border of the hacking community. The authors then explore 
the external factors by emphasizing defining the boundary between their community 
and the computer security industry. The boundary represents an ethical interpretation 
of hacking activity in the sense that distinguishing the activities and membership of 
the two entities poses a difficult problem to researchers (Jordan and Taylor, 1998). 
Finally, the authors reject the partial perspective of the demonization and 
pathologization of hackers as isolated and mentally unstable, and suggest that 
“hacking cannot be clearly grasped unless fears are put aside to try and understand the 
community of hackers, the digital underground” (Jordan and Taylor, 1998).  
Most of the previous studies are based on anecdotal and self-reported evidences. To 
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address this problem, Voiskounsky and Smyslova (2003) present an empirical analysis 
of hackers’ motivations. The underlying model is flow theory/paradigm originated by 
Csikszentmihalyi (1977), which means that “an action follows the previous action, 
and the process is in a way unconscious; flow is accompanied by positive emotions 
and is self-rewarding”. The most important component of flow theory is the precise 
matching of people’s skills and task challenges (Voiskounsky and Smyslova, 2003). 
The empirical results demonstrate that the claim that intrinsic motivation (flow) 
motivates hackers to engage in hacking activities is supported as expected. Besides, 
the least and the most competent hackers experience flow, while the moderately 
competent hackers undergo “flow crisis”, which can be eliminated by properly 
aligning skills with task challenges - the process of flow renovation, thus starting to 
experience flow anew. Their results are considered as innovative and revealing in the 
sense that it rejects the generally accepted hypothesis that the more qualified and 
competent the hackers are, the more flow they experience than their less qualified 
counterparts (Novak and Hoffman, 1997).  
 
Mulhall (1997) argues that although there are large quantities of articles involving the 
exploration of hackers’ motivations, the stream of research is, in a sense, static, which 
means it is not utilized to examine how to deter hackers from committing hacking 
activities. Mulhall (1997) advocates that legal remedies can serve as a deterrent factor 
to hackers and physical or logical barriers to hackers coupled with imprisonment 
punishment can work well. The second effective deterrence is hackers’ fear of being 
caught. Hackers are afraid of being apprehended, which can have a substantially 
negative impact against such aspects as future career prospects, parental action, and 
the confiscation of the equipment. Finally, the author suggests that good access 
control systems together with detection and legal punishment are conducive to 
deterring hackers. Other researchers also examine the deterrent factor in the field of 
information security, which involves two ingredients: the probability of being 
apprehended and the severity of the punishment. Ben-Yehuda (1986) indicates that 
only if both ingredients are at a high level are hackers discouraged from committing 
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hacking activities. However, in the status quo of computer-related offenses, both 
components are at a low level (Ball, 1985; Bloom-Becker, 1986; Hollinger, 1991; 
Michalowski and Pfuhl, 1991).  
 
Lakhani and Wolf (2005), in an attempt to understand the relative success of 
Free/Open Source Software (F/OSS) campaign, are interested in the investigation of 
the factors that motivate F/OSS developers to contribute their time and efforts to 
create free software products. They suggest that intrinsic motivation including 
enjoyment-based and obligation/community-based is the strongest and most 
perceivable impetus for project participation rather than external factors in the form of 
extrinsic benefits such as better jobs and career advancement proposed by previous 
academic researches (Frey, 1997; Lerner and Tirole, 2002). Their final results are 
summarized as follows: efforts in F/OSS projects are original exercise, bringing about 
useful output, and are motivated most by the creativity an individual feels in it. Of 
course, the authors also argue that both extrinsic and intrinsic motivations interact 
with each other - neither one is able to dominate or cancel the other. F/OSS 
developers are motivated by a blend of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations with 
individual creativity as the most significant driver of project participation. The paper 
complements the existing body of research by investigating the motivational factors of 
hackers’ from the perspective of F/OSS and advancing our understanding of the 
underlying motivations in the F/OSS community.  
 
Other research directions also abound in the field of behavior aspects. Straub (1990) 
places emphasis on the design of deterrent, detection, and preventive measures for 
institutions to control information security risks, which helps reduce the probability of 
security breaches. Boss (2005) investigates information security from both a 
behavioral and control perspective, and establishes a theoretical model that 
incorporates the three basic elements of control theory - measurement, evaluation, and 
reward - to examine the efficacy of behavioral controls on the overall security efforts 
within the organizations. Schneier (2005), a pioneering security expert, concludes that 
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modern hacking has been transforming from a hobbyist activity into a criminal one 
ranging from pursuing substantial economic profits to seeking political revenges such 
as cyber-terrorism, which makes them more dangerous and devastating. Furthermore, 
Schechter and Smith (2003) identify and introduce a new type of worm that separates 
the endeavor of creating back-door vulnerabilities from the activity of installing and 
exploiting them on the vulnerable systems. The outcome is minimized risk7 and 
increased incentives to worm’s authors, which makes worms more lucrative to write. 
The authors suggest being alert and careful in using existing security actions to 
safeguard organizations against the use of “access-for-sale” worms. 
 
Although technology-based approaches discussed in Chapter 3.1 do help to resolve 
the issue of information security to some extent, even the perfect technology cannot 
perform successfully unless people involved install, configure, and manage these 
technologies in a correct manner. This is where behavioral methods can kick in and 
play a role. Sometimes, putting ourselves in hackers’ shoes, thinking like a hacker, 
and investigating hackers’ motivations can place us in a more favorable position to 
safeguard against security breaches.  
3.3 Economic Approaches to Information Security 
Compared with technological and behavioral approaches discussed in Chapter 3.1 and 
3.2, economic approaches have only recently been applied to the field of information 
security (Gordon and Loeb, 2002) and researches focusing on the economic aspects of 
information security are relatively sparse (Schechter, 2004). However, with the 
successful promotion of WEIS8, this field is developing at an alarming rate and 
attracting an increasing amount of attention from both economists and security experts. 
The seminal paper (Anderson, 2001) points out the main culprit of the increasing 
number of information security breaches - insufficient incentives, establishes the 
                                                        
7 The risk to the worm’s author is minimized in the sense that he/she does not need to communicate with the 
vulnerable systems, reducing the risk of being detected.  
8 WEIS (the Workshop on the Economics of Information Security) is an annual seminar event first held in 2002 to 
cultivate and intrigue researches in the field of information security.  
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importance of economic approaches to information security, and serves as a milestone 
for later researches in this field. On the whole, we further classify economic 
approaches to information security into five main streams of research directions, that 
is, strategic interactions between hackers and end-users, software vulnerability 
disclosure and patch policies, optimal investment in information security, liability 
assignment and cyberinsurance, and evaluations of information security technologies.  
3.3.1 Strategic Interactions between Hackers and End-users 
Information security is an endeavor involving four groups of agents - end-users, black 
hat hackers, software vendors, and security specialists such as CERT/CC (Png, Tang, 
and Wang, 2006). There is a large stream of researches focusing on the respective 
groups of agents.  
End-users: Kunreuther and Heal (2003) study the incentives of end-users and derive 
the useful result that the incentives of users to invest in information security decrease 
as the number of unprotected agents increases assuming that all agents are identical. 
August and Tunca (2005) examine the users’ incentives to patch security 
vulnerabilities, and demonstrate that in some situations, mandatory patching is 
sub-optimal.  
Black hat hackers: Beveren (2001) develops a conceptual model to portray the 
development of hackers and their motivations. He uses the flow construct that serves 
as moderators to model the evolution of a hacker’s experience. Jordan and Taylor 
(1998) argue that potential malicious motivations such as greed, power, authority, and 
revenge are replacing such benign motivations as curiosity.  
Software vendors and security specialists: In the field of information security, we 
mainly discuss the interactions between software vendors and security specialists such 
as CERT/CC. Since the policies CERT/CC enacts will have a substantial effect on 
vendors’ incentives to invest in information security such as producing products of 
higher security or providing patches more quickly, etc., this research field has drawn a 
lot of attention among economists and security experts. The typical research papers 
include Beattie, Arnold, Cowan, Wagle, and Wright (2002), Arora and Telang (2005), 
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Rescorla (2004), Arora, Krishnan, Telang, and Yang (2005), Browne, McHugh, 
Arbaugh, and Fithen (2000), Nizovtsev and Thursby (2005), Choi, Fershtman, and 
Gandal (2005), Anderson and Schneier (2005), Arora, Forman, Nandkumar, and 
Telang (2006), Png, Tang, and Wang (2006), to name just a few.  
3.3.2 Software Vulnerability Disclosure and Patch Policies 
One of the most heated and intense debates in information security deals with 
software vulnerability disclosure and patch policies. The main issues include such 
open research questions as: (a) The effect of vulnerability disclosure policy on 
vendors’ behaviors, (b) Optimal patch time, and (c) Relationships between the number 
of security breaches and time.  
z The Effect of Vulnerability Disclosure Policy on Vendors’ Behaviors 
Although there is a consensus about the goal of vulnerability disclosure, opinions 
concerning whether full or partial disclosure policy should be established differ 
dramatically, which mainly fall into three categories. Some people argue that the 
details about the information of a vulnerability, including the tools that exploit it, 
should be instantly disclosed to the public, while the other extreme is called partial 
disclosure that advocate waiting and disclosing the flaws only after vendors have 
provided the appropriate patches. Besides, some hybrid disclosures combining the 
above two also exist in the real world. Full disclosure provides strong incentives to the 
vendors to release patches as early as possible (Pond, 2000); however, this practice 
leaves users in a precarious state if there are no appropriate patches to fix the 
vulnerabilities. Therefore, it might be socially undesirable and does not necessarily 
improve overall social security (Elias, 2001; Farrow, 2000).  
 
Arora, Telang, and Xu (2004a) take into consideration three groups of parties - 
software vendors, end-users, and social planners, and develop a theoretical model to 
investigate the effect of early disclosure on vendors’ behaviors and the resulting 
welfare implications. The interesting result indicates that early disclosure of 
vulnerabilities will lead to vendors patching flaws faster, although it might be socially 
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sub-optimal. Arora, Telang, and Xu (2004b) argue that neither full nor partial 
disclosure is optimal in certain specific situations. Wattal and Telang (2004) holds the 
viewpoint that full and immediate disclosure provides impetus for vendors to improve 
the quality and security of their products. Arora and Telang (2005) establish a 
theoretical framework to identify the major ingredients that determine the appropriate 
method of dealing with vulnerability disclosure. They assert that faster disclosure 
motivates vendors to patch more rapidly, but a remarkable portion of users still do not 
fix the patches appropriately. Rescorla (2004) argues that a large quantity of resources 
expended on identifying and patching security breaches does not lead to a remarkable 
quality enhancement of software products. Therefore, the claim that vulnerability 
disclosure can result in enhanced product quality is untenable. Only if vulnerability 
disclosure is significantly correlated, then it is advisable to disclose software 
vulnerabilities; otherwise, it will cause substantial losses to the victims. The result is 
quite novel and discouraging to vulnerability disclosure, but whether the claim is valid 
or not requires further empirical analysis using more recent data sources and more 
advanced economic models in further researches.  
z Optimal Patch Time 
Another important research question in the case of information security is to derive 
the optimal patch time that minimizes the losses. Patched too soon or too frequently, it 
will incur great operational costs, which is sometimes unaffordable. Besides, the 
patches may not be tested thoroughly, which might have some other potential 
vulnerabilities. On the other hand, if patches are released too late or less frequently, 
the systems are left in a precarious state subject to vulnerability exploits by the 
hackers. Therefore, it involves a tradeoff between the above two choices and that is 
the reason why this field is attracting an increasing number of attention from security 
experts and economists.  
 
Beattie, Arnold, Cowan, Wagle, and Wright (2002) propose a theoretical model to 
investigate the factors determining when it is optimal to apply security patches. In 
addition, they also use empirical data to provide the model with more practical value. 
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They argue that the optimal time to apply security patches is 10 and 30 days after the 
release of the patches, which can serve as best practices adopted by security 
practitioners when they need to apply security patches. Cavusoglu, Cavusoglu, and 
Zhang (2006) construct a game theoretical model to determine the optimal frequency 
of updating security patches, which resolves the tradeoff between high operational 
costs and security risks subject to hackers’ exploiting vulnerabilities. They analyze 
two settings, namely centralized and decentralized systems, respectively, and, in the 
decentralized setting, successfully resolve the problem of how to coordinate the patch 
release policy adopted by software vendors and the patch update policy taken by the 
companies that use such mechanisms as cost sharing or legal liability, which means 
that the optimal patch management entails appropriate synchronization of patch 
release and update practices. However, several limitations compromise the 
applicability of the results derived. The authors assume that one computer has exactly 
one vulnerable software subject to malicious exploits. But, it is not necessarily the 
case in the practical situations. Furthermore, the severity of different vulnerabilities is 
set constant (exogenous), because it is generally hard to distinguish severe security 
flaws from non-severe ones (Donner, 2003). The results might be more valid and 
convincing if these problems can be addressed more appropriately.  
z Relationships between the Number of Security Breaches and Time 
Common sense tells us that the number of security breaches will increase with the 
time since the start of the exploit cycle. However, the accurate relationships such as 
linearity or non-linearity are, to a large extent, non-trivial and untouched. One of the 
pioneering empirical researches is Browne, McHugh, Arbaugh, and Fithen (2000)’s 
paper that conducts an empirical study investigating the relationships between the 
number of security breaches and time since hackers first exploited the vulnerabilities. 
They find that the number of security breaches increases in proportion to the square 
root of the time, which can be modeled with the following formula: TC ×+= 10 ββ , 
where C is the number of security incidents and T is the time. To the best of our 
knowledge, the paper is the first scholarly endeavor that addresses this relationship, 
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and the model can be used to predict the rate of incidents’ growth as well as to enable 
organizations to proactively rather than reactively allocate appropriate resources to 
deal with security breaches.  
3.3.3 Optimal Investment in Information Security 
With the tendency of organizations’ increasing dependence on information systems 
and billions of dollars expended on information security, economics of information 
security investment has drawn more and more attention and has become an important 
branch of economics of information security with significant implications for 
organizational practices. This direction mainly involves researches that identify 
optimal security investment levels under different circumstances. The seminal 
research can be ascribed to the study of Gordon and Loeb (2002), which innovatively 
presents a simple and relatively general economic model that determines the optimal 
amount of a company’s investment to safeguard corporate information assets against 
security breaches in a single-period setting. They examine two broad classes of 
security breach probability functions and derive a quite interesting result that for those 
two classes of functions, the optimal amount of security investment should by no 
means exceed  of the expected losses caused by security breaches. 
Nevertheless, Willemson (2006) successfully finds the counterexamples to the above 
result and claims that whether the universal upper limit exists is open to question, 
since the real situations might fall beyond the two general classes of functions. 
Further directions for improvement to Willemson (2006) include investigating other 
aspects of information security investments such as enhanced government 
enforcement to increase the attacks’ costs in addition to simply considering users’ 
efforts to decrease the probability of security breaches. Huang, Hu, and Behara (2006) 
propose an economic model that investigates simultaneous attacks from multiple 
external agents with distinct characteristics, and derive the optimal investment level in 
this context. It also distinguishes two types of security attacks: distributed and 
targeted attacks, which are often neglected by just focusing on the total attacks. 




these two types of attacks to organizations. The main results are as follows: (a) Since 
a company encounters both distributed and targeted attacks, when the budget is 
relatively small, it is advisable to allocate the money to distributed attacks, because 
distributed attacks can be safeguarded against more efficiently and with relatively 
smaller investments, (b) When losses from targeted attacks are very substantial, the 
company had better invest all its money to prevent targeted attacks even if the budget 
is quite limited, and (c) The percentage of the investment in safeguarding targeted 
attacks increases when the budget augments. However, this paper is by no means free 
from limitations. It only considers the company as a risk-neutral agent like that in 
Gordon and Loeb’s model (2002), while most of the firms are risk-averse in the real 
situation. Besides, the paper fails to investigate the interdependencies of the above 
two types of attacks, and just examine them independently.  
 
Since the investment in information security always needs to compete for resources 
with other business opportunities, the chief information security officer (CISO) is 
required to provide a concrete and convincing analysis of the effect of investments in 
information security on the organizations concerned in order to justify the need to 
protect it. The prerequisite of this demanding project is to accurately measure security 
risks. In the risk management literature, on the whole, three streams of research have 
evolved to measure security risks: (a) Annual Loss Expected (ALE), (b) Security 
savings (S) and Benefit (B), and (c) Investment Return: ROI and IRR. Table 3.1 
summarizes the approaches to employ these three metrics. However, each of these 
metrics has certain limitations, which compromises its applicability into real 
problems.  
 
To accurately measure security attacks, Schechter (2004) proposes an original metric - 
security strength, which uses the market price to find a new vulnerability (MPV) as a 
measure of security strength. The novel metric MPV can also be used to differentiate 
secure products from insecure ones by establishing an upper bound on the MPV of the 
competing products below that of the lower bound of its own products’ MPV. 
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However, although this approach has served as a milestone for future researches, 
Schechter’s vulnerability market (VM) encounters several challenges, such as the 
problem of expense, reputation, copyright infringement, etc. Ozment (2004) makes a 
preliminary effort to identify fields where auction theory can play an active role to 
improve the efficiency and efficacy of the VM proposed by Schechter. However, it 
calls for radical changes to the management environment of organizations to 
implement such a bug auction.  
Specific Metric Abbreviation Approach to Calculate 
Annual Loss Expected ALE Expected rate of loss * Value of loss 
Savings S ALE baseline – ALE with new safeguards
Benefit B S + (Profit from new ventures) 
Return On Investment ROI 
safeguards of Cost
B  












Table 3.1 Common Metrics to Measure Security Risks 
3.3.4 Liability Assignment and Cyberinsurance 
Although organizations are generally increasing the investment in information 
security (Mears, 2004), the current security environment has left most of them in a 
precarious state (Gordon, Loeb, and Lucyshyn, 2005). Anderson (2001) asserts that 
information security calls for more economic approaches than simply technological 
methods, and that sufficient economic incentives should be established first as a solid 
foundation in order to implement technical defenses more appropriately (Anderson, 
1993). Varian (2000) further identifies misplaced liability assignment as the main 
cause of information insecurity. He advocates that liability should be assigned to the 
party that can manage and prevent security risks in the most efficient manner. In the 
real world, Varian argues that network operators and computer owners should be 
responsible for the financial losses caused by security breaches via their computers to 
third parties, and software vendors are to be held accountable for vulnerabilities in 
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their products. Another innovative idea in his paper is that the parties that have the 
liability for security breaches can and should outsource the risks and buy 
cyberinsurance. In this way, firms are safeguarded against potential losses of 
damaging security risks or indemnification parties.  Following Varian (2000)’s lead, 
many economists are conducting related researches that apply insurance to 
information security - so called “cyberinsurance9”. Majuca, Yurcik, and Kesan (2006) 
write a good paper by tracing the evolution of cyberinsurance from traditional 
insurance policies to current cyberinsurance products, and point out that the status quo 
of information security environment calls for an increasing demand for 
cyberinsurance, which can better address security risks. Kesan, Majuca, and Yurcik 
(2005) employ a simple model demonstrating that cyberinsurance leads to higher 
security investment, facilitates criteria for best practices, and brings about higher 
social welfare. Bohme (2005) identifies the correlation in cyber risks, especially 
prevalent in the current information age, as the major barrier to cyberinsurance. He 
constructs an indemnity insurance model to claim different premiums for different 
users, which resolves the correlation problem. However, the model also suffers from 
several limitations of simplicity and overly strict assumptions in terms of the demand 
side. As a further endeavor, Bohme and Kataria (2006) find that not all cyber-risk 
classes have similar correlation attributes, and then manage to introduce a novel 
classification of cyber-risk classes using a two-tier approach, namely, within-firm tier 
and global tier, respectively. Furthermore, Baer (2003) summarizes the major 
impediments that currently limit the scope and effectiveness of cyberinsurance: lack 
of agreement on basic policy definitions and language, lack of underwriting 
experience, lack of adequate reinsurance, and policy exclusions.  
3.3.5 Evaluations of Information Security Technologies 
In this section, we mainly review the current status of honeypots (also called 
honeynets or honeytokens), which are information system resources employed to be 
                                                        
9 Cyberinsurance is aimed at reducing cyber risks by providing additional insurance coverage to the realm of 
information security. Interested readers may refer to Kesan et al. (2005), Amanda (2000), Bohme (2005), etc.  
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attacked and penetrated to capture activities on them so as to keep track of any misuse 
and to decrease the risks imposed by the honeypots to other systems (Spitzner, 2003; 
Honeynet Project, 2001). With the increasing popularity of honeypots in the field of 
information security, a large stream of researches has been focused on this emerging 
area, producing a lot of valuable research papers. Dornseif and May (2004) 
summarize the benefits and costs of implementing honeynets, which is helpful to the 
understanding of the economic aspects of honeynet deployment. The benefits of 
employing honeynets include potential information gathered concerning hackers’ 
attacking patterns and potential enhanced security by using honeynets as a decoy and 
by using aggressive honeynets for redirection. On the other hand, costs of 
implementing honeynets should also be considered thoroughly, such as costs of 
deploying, costs of operation, and costs of increased risks to the user’s own network 
(Dornseif and May, 2004). Dacier, Pouget, and Debar (2004) first conduct an 
experiment with several honeypots implemented for four months and derive many 
important results: (a) The regularity represented by the data demonstrates the value of 
using honeypots to track attack processes, and (b) Honeypots should be placed in 
different locations to eliminate the bias of particular places and produce a relatively 
general conclusion concerning attacks. Pouget and Dacier (2004) further conduct the 
honeypot research by devising a simple clustering approach to obtain more in-depth 
as well as useful information on tracked attacks. They use the algorithms of 
association rules in Data Mining and phrases distance to identify the root causes of 
observed attacks, which is very helpful for a deeper understanding of attacks. Their 
paper applies algorithms in computer science to the economics of information security, 
which complements the existing body of research in this area. However, the clusters 
derived are still open for further refinement. In their third academic endeavor, Pouget, 
Dacier, and Pham (2004) set up a honeypot environment deployed for as long as 18 
months and derive useful data to better understand the attack patterns. The results in 
this paper confirm the findings in their previous researches, which indicate the value 
of using honeypots to track attack processes. The limitation of their paper might be 
the relatively concentrated places mainly in Europe where honeypots are deployed. 
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That is to say, a larger number of honeypots deployed in various places may make the 
results more convincing and reliable. On the whole, the above three papers pave the 
way for deploying honeypots to obtain data that can be used to establish empirical 
models of the attack patterns in the real world.  
 
After a relatively complete literature review of economic approaches to information 
security, we identify two possible research directions that are worth delving into: (a) 
Cyberinsurance, and (b) Empirical studies that incorporate government enforcement 
into the general framework. Cyberinsurance brings about higher security investment, 
facilitates criteria for best practices, and leads to enhanced social welfare. In addition, 
cyberinsurance is still rather nascent as an industry and is rapidly expanding in terms 
of the market share (Peter, 2002). Therefore, it is worthwhile and promising to employ 
cyberinsurance as a powerful weapon to better address information security issues. A 
review of the existing literature also reveals that compared with researches on 
economic modeling, empirical analyses in information security are relatively sparse in 
quantities due to insufficient and relatively stale data for the variables in the model. 
Besides, almost no papers described above explicitly take into consideration the effect 
of government enforcement on hackers’ behaviors. Even if some research papers 
occasionally touch government enforcement, they fail to fully investigate it or subject 
it to empirical testing. To fill this void, we plan to conduct an empirical study to 
investigate the effect of government enforcement against hackers’ behaviors using 
real-world data collected from diverse sources. We hope this study can shed light on 
the impact of cyber-law and cyber-regulation that can effectively and efficiently deter 
hackers from committing cyber-crimes. The first possible research direction - 
cyberinsurance - is left as future research work, and this paper centers on the second 
direction - empirical studies involving government enforcement in the general model. 
Since event study methodology is employed to investigate the impact of government 
enforcement, it is necessary to present a brief literature review of event study analysis 
in the next chapter before discussing its methodology and data source.  
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Chapter 4 The Effect of Government 
Enforcement against Hackers’ Behaviors 
Information security is an issue of important concern to organizations as well as 
governments, and many researchers have been engaging in this dynamic and 
promising field. However, while prior researches provide important insights into the 
behaviors of various parties in the field of information security, nearly none of them 
directly investigates the effect of government enforcement. The objective of this paper 
is to fill this gap by focusing on one factor that has been, to the best of our knowledge, 
untouched yet in former researches and shedding light on the following research 
question: “What is the impact of government enforcement against hackers’ 
behaviors?”. The intuition behind the question is that after the government decides to 
convict or sentence a hacker and the announcement is released to the public by the 
media, it will have a deterrent effect on hackers’ behaviors characterized by reducing 
the number of security breaches launched by other hackers in that country.  
4.1 Literature Review of Event Study Methodology 
In order to measure the effect of government enforcement against hackers’ behaviors, 
event study methodology is adopted. Our methodology follows basically from prior 
event study analysis (Jarrell et al, 1985; Hendricks et al, 1996; Mackinlay, 1997, etc.). 
Event study methodology investigates the magnitude of the effect that a specific event 
has on the market value and profitability of firms associated with this event, that is, 
whether there is any effect of “abnormal” stock prices related to certain unanticipated 
event (Agrawal and Kamakura, 1995). The intuition and implicit assumption in this 
methodology is that security prices respond rapidly and correctly to the infusion of 
new information and current security prices can reflect all the available information; 
therefore, any change in the stock prices is a good indicator of the impact of a specific 




Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) proposed the concept of event study by 
conducting seminal researches in this field as early as more than thirty years ago. 
Since then, event study methodology has been a hot topic and many researchers have 
employed this approach to evaluate the effects of information disclosure on the firms’ 
security prices. The event study has many applications. In the field of accounting and 
finance, event studies are employed to analyze the effect of various firm and industry 
specific events, such as mergers and acquisitions (M&A), issues of new debt or equity, 
company earnings announcements, stock splits, initial public offering (IPO), etc 
(Mackinlay, 1997). Chan-Lau (2001) evaluates the effect of restructuring 
announcements on the stock prices before and after the Commercial Rehabilitation 
Law (CRL) enactment and observes the advancement in market credibility of 
restructuring announcements. Jarrell et al (1985) argue that the recalls of drugs and 
automobiles have a significantly negative influence against corporations’ market value. 
Hendricks et al (1996) assess the effect of quality award winning announcements on 
firms’ market value and come to the conclusion that winning a quality award and 
disclosing it to the public can produce positive abnormal returns. However, 
applications also abound in other realms. In the field of economics, Schwert and 
William (1981) evaluate the effect of changes in the regulatory environment on 
corporations’ market value. Telang and Wattal (2005) employ event study 
methodology to investigate vendors’ incentives to present more secure software. The 
results demonstrate that vulnerability disclosures cause a negative and significant 
decrease in the market value to the software vendor. A vendor, on average, suffers 
from 0.6% decrease in the stock price, which amounts to $0.86 billion in terms of 
market capitalization values per vulnerability announcement. Mark and Tu (2005) use 
event study analysis to estimate the impact of center renovation and expansion on 
shops’ retail sales, and observe that adding entertainment facilities to the mall 
contributes only marginally to the growth of shops’ sales inside it; therefore, it is not 
worth renovating and expanding the mall. In the field of information systems, 
Subramani et al (2001) employ event study methodology to demonstrate that 
e-commerce announcements render significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns 
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(CAR) for corporations. In the realm of information security, Cavusoglu et al (2002) 
conduct the empirical research at an aggregate level and derive the result that security 
breach announcements, on the whole, benefit the market of information security and 
increase their overall market value. Telang and Wattal (2004) argue that vulnerability 
disclosure announcements indeed render significantly negative CARs for specific 
software vendors. Acquisti, Friedman, and Telang (2006) argue that the effect of data 
breaches on the market value of corporations is significantly negative on the 
announcement day for the security breaches. CARs tend to follow a somewhat 
peculiar pattern by first increasing and then declining across days after the 
announcement day. Anyway, no matter what the applications are, the objective is 
essentially the same - to investigate the effect of a given event on the prices of firms’ 
securities, that is, the market value of a corporation.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, while many of the abovementioned researches provide 
important insights into the field of economics of information systems, it seems that 
none of them directly touches government enforcement or analyzes its effect on 
hackers’ behaviors. The goal of this paper is to fill this void by investigating the effect 
of government enforcement on hackers’ behaviors, that is, whether it significantly 
prevents hackers from further launching security attacks. It complements the existing 
body of research in the area of empirical studies of information security and serves as 
an excellent proof to related economic modeling endeavors. In this paper, my 
contribution is to adopt the event study methodology in the context of information 
security to assess the effect of government enforcement on hackers’ behaviors. Our 
rationale for applying event study analysis to this scenario is as follows: though it 
might be impossible to directly evaluate the impact of government enforcement on 
hackers’ behaviors, it is feasible to assess whether or not the decision to enforce a 
stricter punishment towards hackers is considered as a significant deterrent to hackers. 
Due to the substantial costs related to government enforcement, it can be viewed as a 
major event with potential policy as well as financial implications. In addition, since 
government enforcement is often announced to the public in a high profile, it receives 
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considerable media coverage and public attention. Accordingly, hackers tend to take 
into consideration the announcements of government enforcement and weigh the 
benefits against the costs concerning whether it is worthwhile to render security 
breaches in the future. These considerations should be reflected in the number of 
security breaches hackers launch. Therefore, investigating the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) of the number of security attacks due to the intervention of government 
enforcement allows us to assess hackers’ perceptions of the efficacy of the 
enforcement implemented by the government.  
4.2 Methodology 
Event study methodology depends on two assumptions. The first assumption is Fama 
(1970)’s famous efficient market hypothesis (EMH), which argues that current 
security prices reflect all the information, including market, public, and even private 
information. According to this line of reasoning, it is only unanticipated events such 
as government policy and corporate announcements that will enable investors to 
acquire superior profits. The second point assumes that a reasonable and valid pricing 
mechanism exists for researchers to gauge whether a given event exerts a significant 
impact on the dependent variables under consideration. Besides, the mechanism 
withstands a variety of empirical studies and proves to be correct in most, if not all, 
researches.  
4.2.1 Original Use in Finance and Accounting Research 
To start with, it is worthwhile to briefly outline the main procedures of an event study. 
The classic event study processes defined in the application of finance research are as 
follows:  
1) Define the event of interest, and decide the event date as well as the period over 
which stock prices associated with this specific event will be investigated.  
2) Identify financial returns of individual corporations in the context of no event.  
3) Measure the effect of the event by calculating the difference between observed 
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returns (with event) and expected returns (no event) for each corporation - the 
difference is called abnormal returns.  
4) For each specific corporation, given the event window, aggregate the abnormal 
returns across time.  
5) Determine whether the event has a significant impact by statistically testing the 
aggregated abnormal returns with one test statistics.  
 
In the finance research, there are abundant methods to compute the normal return of a 
specific security. The methods can be roughly divided into two groups: statistical and 
economic approaches. Models in the former category just employ statistical 
approaches to assess the asset returns and do not take into considerations the 
economic elements at all, while those in the latter group depend more than on 
statistical assumptions and use economic models as well (Mackinlay, 1997). For ease 
of implementation and estimation, only statistical approaches are employed as the 
underlying model for event study analysis in this paper.  
Models 
A) Constant Mean Return Model 
One of the simplest models might be the constant mean return model, which takes the 
following form:  
itiitR εμ += ,      0)( =itE ε ,       σεε 2)var( iit =
where  is the return of stock  at time t , itR i itε  is the error term of stock  at 
time  with zero expectation and variance , and 
i
t σ ε2i iμ  is denoted as the mean 
return for stock . The abnormal return for the stock of firm  at period ,i i t itε , is 
defined as: iitit R με −= . Simple though the model is, it is robust and often produces 
similar results to those of other complicated models (Brown and Warner, 1980, 1985). 
The reason is that the variance of the abnormal return tends not to diminish a lot with 
a more sophisticated model (Mackinlay, 1997). But, since the market model to be 
discussed later is more widely employed and often yields better results while not 
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adding much to the complexity of the model, we decide to adopt it instead.  
B) Market Model  
The market model marks a significant improvement to the constant mean return 
model by explicitly separating the part of the return that is associated with the 
fluctuations in the market return, thereby reducing the variance of the abnormal return. 
The advantage of this model is the enhanced capability of statistical tests and a higher 
probability to detect the effect of a given event. The market model can be represented 
as follows, which is a little bit similar to the formula of capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) in finance research:  
itmtiiit RR εβα ++= ,    0)( =itE ε ,     σ εε 2)var( iit =
where  and  are the normal (expected) returns of stock  and the market 
assets at period , and
itR mtR i
t itε  is the error term of stock  at time  with zero 




t itε , is then defined as: . EMH assumes that the disturbance 
term 
mtiiitit RR βαε ˆˆ −−=
itε  is a random variable with zero mean and the difference between observed 
and normal returns of stock  at period  should not be significantly different from 
zero, if there is no major event occurring during that period of time. To check whether 
abnormal returns exist due to a given event, we just need to test the null hypothesis 
that the cross-sectional mean of 
i t
itε  is zero. Any significant difference from zero 
implies some portion of observed returns that cannot be accounted for by market 
fluctuations and indeed captures the impact of the specific event. In practice, the 
market assets  employ such indices as the S&P Index, the CRSP Value Weighted 
Index, etc., depending on whether the stock under consideration is listed on NYSE or 
NASDAQ.  
mtR
4.2.2 Adaptation of Event Study Analysis to Our Setting 
The traditional procedures and models of event study methodology are illustrated 
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above. Next, we would like to adapt the processes in the finance research to our 
scenario - economics of information security.  
4.2.2.1 Econometric Model 
(A) Model Variables 
(I) Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable of interest is hackers’ behaviors, which involves many aspects 
such as hackers’ attacking patterns (Honeynet Project, 2003), hackers’ motivations to 
launch security attacks (Sterling, 1992; Post, 1996; Denning, 1998; Taylor, 1999; 
Voiskounsky and Smyslova, 2003; Lakhani and Wolf, 2005), and the number of 
attacks launched by hackers (Browne, McHugh, Arbaugh, and Fithen, 2000, etc.). In 
this paper, we mainly focus on just one facet of hackers’ behaviors - the number of 
attacks launched by hackers. A larger number of security attacks exhibits more 
aggressive behaviors indicating unfavorable information security environment, while 
a smaller number of attacks implies milder actions taken by hackers and 
correspondingly more favorable security condition. It should be noted that the number 
of attacks calculated by the Internet Storm Center (ISC) is limited to those that meet a 
certain severity threshold. In other words, those attacks that do not incur great losses 
to users are not counted by the ISC. Apart from this limitation, the number of attacks 
recorded by the ISC includes most of the general security attacks committed by 
hackers and is therefore considered to be a key variable that characterizes hackers’ 
behaviors from an important perspective.  
(II) Independent Variables 
Unemployment Rate 
The monthly standardized unemployment rate calculated by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics of each country represents the number of the unemployed who actively seek 
jobs but are unable to find jobs as a percentage of the whole labor force. Discouraged 
workers who do not have a job but do not make efforts to find a new one are not 
counted as unemployed or as part of the labor force. The unemployment rate is a key 
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indicator of the general social and economic condition. When the economy is gaining 
momentum, the unemployment rate tends to be low and it is relatively easy for a 
person who needs a job to find one. On the other hand, when the economy is in 
recession or stagnating, the unemployment rate tends to be high and a person who 
wants to land a job may experience much trouble finding one. The resulting outcome 
might involve crime, increased poverty, political instability, mental health problems, 
etc. Recent empirical studies have lent much support to the hypothesized positive 
relationship between unemployment and total suicide rate (Chuang and Huang, 1997; 
Brainerd, 2001; Neumayer, 2003). Brenner (1979) indicates that increasing 
unemployment tends to raise the whole crime rate, suicide rate, and leads to worse 
health conditions. Unemployment implies fewer economic opportunities, reducing the 
individual’s expected income level and thus increasing the possibility of committing 
crimes. Therefore, the unemployment rate is considered to be an important variable 
that affects peoples’ behaviors. Generally speaking, it is hypothesized that when the 
unemployment rate is at a high level, more people will be laid off, thus increasing the 
likelihood of committing crimes including computer hacking. On the other hand, 
lower unemployment rate usually helps prevent mass poverty and violence, thereby 
decreasing the odds of committing crimes such as hacking activities. An 
unemployment rate ranging from 4% to 6% is thought of as “healthy”. However, 
unemployment also, to some extent, benefits the entire economy in the sense that it 
keeps inflation from reaching a high level and allows employers to identify the 
employees who are more suitable to the jobs offered. But more often than not, lower 
unemployment rate is more desirable from the perspective of both society and 
individuals; therefore, it is hypothesized in our paper that the unemployment rate is 
positively related to hackers’ behaviors - the number of attacks launched.  
Government Enforcement 
Government enforcement involves the implementation of information security 
legislation to prevent misuses and exploits of information technology. It serves to 
promote the general welfare and helps to create a stable environment for a sound 
economy (U.S. Constitution, preamble). The United States has consistently been a 
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leader in the development and enforcement of information security legislation to gain 
a clear understanding of the problems facing the information security area and 
identify corresponding punishments for the individuals as well as organizations that 
are unable to meet the requirements in the U.S. crime laws. The general U.S. 
computer crime laws include the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (CFA Act), 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), Computer Security Act of 1987, 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLB), National Information Infrastructure 
Protection Act of 1996, U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001, etc (Whitman and Mattord, 2003). 
Of course, other countries including United Kingdom, China, and Germany are 
following U.S. lead to carry out effective government enforcement to control 
information security crimes.  
 
It is generally acknowledged that government enforcement has a significantly 
negative impact on hackers’ behaviors - when a government carries out more severe 
enforcement against hackers, the number of security attacks tends to decrease, while 
when a government conducts milder enforcement towards hackers, the number of 
security attacks is expected to increase. Therefore, government enforcement is 
considered to be the event of interest that has a profound influence on hackers’ 
behaviors. However, to the best of our knowledge, government enforcement has never 
been directly researched or subjected into empirical testing before. The goal of our 
paper is to fill this void by measuring the effect of government enforcement on 
hackers’ behaviors.  
 
To illustrate the distinctive impact of enforcements of different magnitude, 
government enforcement can be further divided into two categories: (1) Prison 
enforcement such as prison sentence, imprisonment, etc., represented by EJAIL, and 
(2) Non-prison enforcement such as fines in restitution, hours of community service, 
deprivation of using the Internet for a specified period of time, etc., denoted by 
ENOTJAIL. However, in the case of event study methodology, since we can only 
measure the overall effect of one event at a given time point, government enforcement 
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is treated as a variable that incorporates both prison and non-prison enforcement. In 
our further research, government enforcement will be separated into two parts to 
further address the respective effects of prison and non-prison enforcement.  
Vulnerability Notes 
Vulnerability is defined as a technical flaw or weakness in a system’s design, 
implementation, or operation and management that can be exploited to violate the 
system’s security policy (SANS Institute, 2006). Vulnerability notes have two-fold 
effects on hackers’ behaviors. On the one hand, the disclosure of vulnerability notes 
provides strong incentives for software vendors to release patches as early as possible 
and improve the security of their products (Pond, 2000), thus helping to create a 
sound information security environment and rendering it profitless for hackers to 
further launch security attacks. The outcome is hypothesized to be a decreasing 
number of attacks committed. On the other hand, since vulnerability notes involve not 
only descriptions and impact of a variety of vulnerabilities but also their 
corresponding solutions and exploits, they provide hackers with a good opportunity to 
“reverse-engineer” the process and launch security attacks. Besides, although 
vulnerability disclosure motivates vendors to patch more rapidly, a remarkable portion 
of users still do not fix the patches appropriately or in time (Arora and Telang, 2005). 
However, hackers are aware of the vulnerabilities and the chance of exploits now, 
which motivates them to take advantage of this opportunity to conduct hacking 
activities, thus leaving end-users in a precarious state. Therefore, it might be socially 
undesirable and does not necessarily improve overall information security (Elias, 
2001; Farrow, 2000). Actually, the ultimate impact of vulnerability notes on hackers’ 
behaviors depends on the interaction and balances of theses two competing effects. 
Anyway, regardless of the final positive or negative effect, vulnerability notes are 
considered to be a key variable that affects hackers’ behaviors.  
 
Since vulnerability notes include a variety of security attacks or compute-related 
exploits, it is worthwhile to classify them into different categories so as to assess the 
respective effects of various vulnerability notes disclosure on hackers’ behaviors. 
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Fadia (2006) presents a good summary of the most common attacks exploited by 
hackers across the world, which includes: DoS attacks, IP spoofing attacks, Password 
cracking attacks, Windows attacks, UNIX attacks, Trojan attacks, Keylogger attacks, 
Input validation attacks, Buffer overflows, Log file hacking, etc. Based on this 
classification and the vulnerability notes on the websites of SecurityFocus and 
CERT/CC, we decide to categorize vulnerability notes into three major groups: (a) 
security breaches due to DoS and DDoS, represented by VDoS, (b) security breaches 
due to Buffer Overflow, marked by VBUFFER, and (c) security breaches due to other 
attacks, such as IP Spoofing Attacks, Windows Attacks, Input Validation 
Vulnerabilities, etc., denoted by VOTHERS. These three categories of vulnerability 
notes can be considered as control variables in the model in the sense that they remain 
constant for different countries.  







Number of Attacks 
Government 
Enforcement 
(Event of Interest) 
 
Figure 4.1: Variables Affecting the Hackers’ Behaviors 
Given the model in Figure 4.1, hackers’ behaviors characterized by the number of 
security attacks for country  at period  are modeled as:  i t
itititititiit VOVBVDURAttackNo εααααβ +++++= 4321_  
For simplicity, for a given country, the model can be described as:  
tttttt VOVBVDURAttackNo εααααβ +++++= 4321_  
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where  is the daily number of attacks committed by the hackers in the 
absence of the event in time ;  is the monthly unemployment rate of the 
country;  is the number of vulnerability notes due to DoS attacks;  is the 
number of vulnerability notes due to Buffer Overflow; and  is the number of 
vulnerability notes due to other security attacks. The form is a bit like the market 
model in finance and accounting research. Since the objective of this paper is to 
investigate the effect of government enforcement, it is self-evident that government 
enforcement (event of interest) should not appear in the model of event study 














Actually, it is easy to observe that the abnormal return is the error term of the model 
calculated using out-of-sample (simulation) data which will be discussed in detail in 
the later sections. Details of data sources and their definitions are to be addressed in 
the next section.  
4.3 Data Sources and Definitions 
4.3.1 Dependent Variable  
The Number of Attacks (Daily) 
For the dependent variable - the number of attacks, data are collected from the country 
reports of the Internet Storm Center (ISC) at SANS Institute. The country reports on 
the ISC are generated based on the outputs of DShield sensors (www.dshield.org). 
Since the aim of this paper is to assess the effect of government enforcement on 
hackers’ behaviors at the country level, the countries of interest should be first 
identified. As the ISC only lists countries which are among the top 20 in the world 
attacked by hackers, we need to make sure that the data are available for all the 
countries investigated on every sampling day. Now comes the question: if we include 
more countries in the country list, we can have a broader view of the situations of 
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security breaches across countries, but the more the countries are incorporated, the 
lower the probability that the data are available for all those countries on the website 
on any sampling day. Therefore, there is a tradeoff between the number of countries 
involved and the available data for the number of attacks for all the countries included. 
Since the ISC includes the country reports for the number of attacks from 2004/1/1 to 
the present time, we plan to collect data from 2004/1/1 to 2006/8/1, which spans more 
than two and a half years and contains more than 900 observations. But due to some 
technical problems associated with the ISC, the actual number of observations is only 
about 600 at most for a given country. In addition, since it is only comparable when 
all the countries included are sampled on the same day, this will further reduce the 
number of observations. The reasonable threshold is assumed to be around 300 
sampling days. Therefore, we first select such countries that have more than 300 
observations during that period of time (Please see Table 4.1) and then further choose 
countries that have data available on every sampling day by using Java network 
programming to automatically extract available data from the ISC. As a result, BE 
(Belgium) is eliminated from the country list; therefore, the final list of countries 
involved includes: AU (Australia), BR (Brazil), CA (Canada), CN (China), DE 
(Germany), ES (Spain), FR (France), GB (United Kingdom), IT (Italy), JP (Japan), 
KR (Korea), NL (Netherlands), PL (Poland), SE (Sweden), TW (Taiwan), US (United 
States) - 16 countries in all. The ultimate number of sampling days is just 300, 
fulfilling the threshold assumption. The start day is 2004/1/5 and the end day is 
2006/7/26, and the intervals between any two sampling days are not necessarily the 
same. For example, the sampling days take the following form: 2004/1/5, 2004/1/7, 
2004/1/11, 2004/1/23, … , 2006/6/20, 2006/6/22, and 2006/7/26.  
US DE CN JP TW KR FR AU BE 
559 562 570 558 556 559 561 559 309 
BR CA ES GB IT NL PL SE  
558 572 561 559 519 528 516 413  
Table 4.1: List of Countries that Have Data on More Than 300 Sampling Days 
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4.3.2 Independent Variables 
(A) Standardized Unemployment Rate (Monthly) 
Standardized unemployment rate is sampled monthly and collected from various data 
sources. Actually, it is quite hard to find the data for all of these 16 countries on a 
monthly basis, but we still manage to collect almost all the data properly. For 
European Union countries such as Germany, Sweden, Spain, Poland, Italy, France, 
United Kingdom, and Netherlands, and some other economically powerful countries 
such as Japan and USA, we can use the automatic bulk downloads on the Eurostat 
(http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm) to gather data; for Australia and Canada, we can 
log on to OECD (http://www.oecd.org/home/) to collect data; for Korea, Korean 
National Statistical Office (http://www.nso.go.kr/eng/index.html) provides an 
excellent data source for our project; for Taiwan, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 
compiled by the National Statistical Bureau of Taiwan is used to collect data of 
unemployment rate; and finally for China, data are collected from the publication of 
China Monthly Economic Indicators.  
(B) Government Enforcement (Daily) 
Government enforcement is the event of interest and mainly deals with the arrest, 
conviction, sentence, fines, or compulsory community service of hackers by the 
government. We consulted major newspapers for announcements of government 
enforcement between 2004/1/1 and 2006/8/1, and finally identified Factiva as the 
main data source. Factiva is an electronic newspaper subscribed by National 
University of Singapore (NUS) Digital Library, which provides essential business 
news and information from a wide variety of sources such as the Wall Street Journal, 
the Financial Times, Dow Jones and Reuters, and also provides strong search engines 
for access to this rich content collection. The database settings are defined as follows: 
Source: All Sources; Company: All Companies; Subject: All Subjects; Industry: 
All Industries; Region: All Regions; Language: English or Chinese-Traditional or 
Chinese-Simplified. We use the following search keywords: hack* and (convict* or 
sentenc* or prosecut*). Besides, we also conducted a thorough search of other 
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newspapers and Internet resources such as Google to search for any leakage of 
government enforcement towards hackers that is somehow not included in Factiva by 
keying in the search keywords: hack* and (convict* or sentence* or prosecut*) and 
(every country name) to make the list of events more complete. A typical event of 
government enforcement might be like this: “A 21-year-old Indiana member of a 
hacking gang was sentenced to 21 months in prison for breaking into Defense 
Department computers, federal law enforcement officials said” (reported by CMP 
TechWeb, 12 May 2005). Another thing that needs to be noted is that an event might 
be reported by several newspapers, to avoid redundancy of the effects, we simply 
count as valid the first source for such event, and discard later reports. Table 4.2 lists 
the number of events for each country. As can be seen from the table, the number of 
events varies dramatically from country to country.  
AU BR CA CN DE ES FR GB 
0 1 3 15 1 2 0 8 
IT JP KR NL PL SE TW US 
0 3 2 1 0 0 0 25 
Table 4.2: The Number of Events for Each Country 
 
(C) Vulnerability Notes (Daily) 
For the vulnerability notes, data are collected from two main security websites - 
CERT/CC (www.cert.org) and SecurityFocus (www.securityfocus.com). The former 
website has a section called Vulnerability Notes Database, which provides 
descriptions, impact, as well as solutions of a variety of vulnerabilities, while the 
latter website has a part named Vulnerabilities that offers a complete list of info, 
discussion, exploit, solution, and references of various vulnerabilities. To measure the 
respective effects of different categories of vulnerability notes, they are further 
divided into three major groups: vulnerabilities caused by DoS, Buffer Overflow, and 
other forms of security attacks. The final values for vulnerability notes are aggregated 




A summary of descriptive statistics of the independent and dependent variables is 
reported in Table 4.3.  
Variables Source Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. 
#_of_Attack Internet 
Storm Center 





7.13% 6.10% 19.80% 3.20% 3.46% 
EJAIL Factiva 8.54*10-3 0.00 1.00 0.00 9.20*10-2
ENOTJAIL Factiva 5.83*10-3 0.00 1.00 0.00 7.61*10-2
VDoS CERT/CC, 
SecurityFocus 
1.40 1.00 31.00 0.00 2.42 
VBuffer CERT/CC, 
SecurityFocus 
1.45 1.00 20.00 0.00 2.24 
VOthers CERT/CC, 
SecurityFocus 
8.99 7.00 134.00 0.00 11.26 
Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
In addition, the correlation matrix is presented in Table 4.4 in order to measure the 
strength and direction of the relationships among different independent variables and 
between independent and dependent variables.  
  UR EJAIL ENOTJAIL VDoS VBuffer VOthers #_of_Attack
UR 1       
EJAIL -0.048** 1      
ENOTJAIL -0.054** 0.260** 1     
VDoS -0.011 0.025 0.011 1    
VBuffer -0.003 0.026 0.006 0.477** 1   
VOthers -0.025 0.025 -0.004 0.0756** 0.587** 1  
#_of_Attack -0.177** 0.171** 0.122** -0.022 -0.014 -0.034* 1 
**.  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
Table 4.4: Correlation Matrix for Dependent and Independent Variables 
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As seen from the table, the correlations among different independent variables are 
quite low, which seems to indicate that multicollinearity between predictors is not a 
potential problem. However, the test of correlation suffers from several limitations: 1) 
There are no hard rules to stipulate how high the correlations between predictors are 
when multicollinearity exists, and 2) Correlation fails to detect the multicollinearity 
among more than two variables due to the method itself. Therefore, to confirm the 
previous result, more formal methods should be employed. Here, we adopt the 
variance inflation factor (VIF), which is the inverse of an independent variable’s 
unique variance that cannot be explained by the rest of the predictors. In other words, 
VIF measures how much the variance of the estimated regression coefficient increases 
if the independent variables are correlated with each other. According to the rule of 
thumb, when VIF is greater than 5 - 10, then the regression coefficient is considered 
to be poorly estimated. Table 4.5 shows the results of VIF tests for every independent 
variable. As seen from the table, none of the VIFs is larger than 5, which implies the 
nonexistence of multicollinearity.  
Variables UR EJAIL ENOTJAIL VDoS VBuffer VOthers 
VIF 1.005 1.075 1.075 2.345 1.533 2.765 
Table 4.5: The Results of VIFs for Every Independent Variable 
4.4 Procedures to Apply Event Study Analysis to Our Setting 
In this section, the steps to apply event study methodology are discussed in great 
detail both technically and practically in the context of our paper. The major 
procedures and statistical inferences mainly follow those in Mackinlay (1997)’s 
introductory paper.  
Step 1: Since the objective of this paper is to investigate the effect of government 
enforcement on hackers’ behaviors, the event of interest is government enforcement, 
whether in the form of prison enforcement such as conviction and sentence or in the 
form of non-prison enforcement including fines and compulsory community service 
hours. The event date is the day when government enforcement is first disclosed to the 
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public. Next, it is essential to specify explicitly the period of interest also known as 
the event window. The smallest event window is one day - the day when the event 
takes place. But in reality, the event window is often set to be larger than one to better 
capture the effect of the event after the announcement day and also to facilitate the 
application of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the event day. Furthermore, 
days before the event day are also incorporated in the analysis to account for any 
information leakage concerning the event. In this research, for the sake of better 
measuring the aggregate effect of the event, we decide to expand the size of the event 
window to 15, composed of 7 pre-event days, one event day, and 7 post-event days.  
Step 2: The model in our paper is represented by:  
ttttt VOVBVDURAttackNoExpected 4321 ˆˆˆˆˆ__ ααααβ ++++=  
The number of security attacks can be identified using this equation in the absence of 
the enforcement variable. Next, it is necessary to specify the length of the estimation 
window. The longer the estimation window, the more accurate the coefficients can be 
derived from the estimation equation. However, there exists a tradeoff: larger 
estimation window tends to reduce the number of events that can be used to conduct 
event study methodology. In addition, given the fact that generally unemployment rate 
is cyclical within one year, one year is long enough to serve as the period of the 
estimation window. For each event, since, from 2004/1/1 to 2004/12/31, there are a 
total of 68 sampling days for all the countries, the 68 sampling days prior to the event 
window are used as the estimation window. Therefore, the estimation window is from 
 to  and the event window is from 75−t 8−t 7−t  to 7+t . Figure 4.2 illustrates 
the time line for the whole event study (The event day is day 0). Note that, sometimes, 
some researchers also create the post-event window after the event window, but 
whether it is worthwhile to do so depends on the actual situation under investigation.  
 Estimation Window           Event Window 
 7+t  07−t8−t75−t  




Since the estimation window is set to be 68, only events that occur after 2004/12/31 
can be employed to measure their effects on hackers’ behaviors. The final number of 
events for each country is summarized as follows: 0 events for Australia, 0 events for 
Brazil, 3 events for Canada, 15 events for China, 0 event for Germany, 2 events for 
Spain, 0 events for France, 6 events for United Kingdom, 0 events for Italy, 3 events 
for Japan, 2 events for Korea, 1 event for Netherlands, 0 event for Poland, 0 event for 
Sweden, 0 event for Taiwan, and 17 for United States.  
 
Also, there exists the problem of sampling days vs. calendar days. Since event study 
methodology is designed based on calendar days, while we just take into account 
sampling days; therefore, we should redefine the event window in terms of sampling 
days. For instance, Figure 4.3 gives the time sequence for the real situation in our 
setting. For the specific event, there are only three sampling days in the 15-day event 
window. Therefore, we can only accumulate CARs for these three days and calculate 
their corresponding variance. Actually, the largest event window is 15 days and the 
actual event window depends on how many sampling days there are in 15 continuous 
days around the event day. But for simplicity and ease of exposition, we use the 
[ , 7T ] event window only when illustrating the main steps. When it comes 
to computing the CARs and their corresponding variances, we will still employ the 
actual event window.  




Also Event Day 
7−t  
Calendar Day Sampling Day
Figure 4.3: Time Sequence for the Real Situation 
 
Step 3: First, supposing that the four basic assumptions are fulfilled, ordinary least 
squares (OLS) is a best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) to calculate the coefficients 
for the model. For a specific country, the OLS estimators for an estimation window of 
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observations during the period from 750 −T  to 80 −T  (The event day is assumed to 
be ) can be derived quite easily. After obtaining the coefficients for the estimation 
window, the expected number of attacks can then be calculated by plugging in the 
coefficients into the model for the event window (quite similar to the Forecast 
function in EViews) during the period from 
0T
70 −T  to 70 +T .  
ttttt VOVBVDURAttackNoExpected 4321 ˆˆˆˆˆ__ ααααβ ++++=  
Data for the observed number of attacks are collected directly from the data on the 
ISC. The abnormal return - the difference between the observed number of attacks and 










The null hypothesis assumes that the abnormal returns are jointly normally distributed 
with a zero mean and variance . Before we use specific statistics to 





Step 4: For each country, given the event window, the abnormal returns are 
aggregated across time. The reason why abnormal returns should be aggregated is to 
draw overall inferences for the event under investigation. Actually, the aggregation 
should be conducted across two dimensions: 1) across time, and 2) across all the 
events taking place in a given country. First, we aggregate the abnormal returns across 
time for a given event  during the event window, and the result is called cumulative 













iti ARTTCAR  
When the length of the estimation window increases, in an asymptotical sense, the 




























Therefore, the distribution of the CAR is described as:  
))7,7(,0(~)7,7( 00
2
00 +−+− TTNTTCAR ii σ  
The above distribution is just applicable to the condition of one event. But since only 
one event is incapable of characterizing the overall effect of such events for a 
particular country, it is essential to aggregate the events within one given country. 
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Therefore, after a two-dimensional aggregation, the distribution of the ACAR is:  
))]7,7(var(,0[~)7,7( 0000 +−+− TTCARNTTCAR  
 
Step 5: Determine whether the event has a significant effect by statistically testing the 
ACAR with one test statistics. The null hypothesis H0 can be verified using the 












The criterion is that if the -value is less than 0.05 (Sometimes, the threshold can be 
extended to 0.1), then government enforcement (event of interest) is considered to 
have a significant effect on hackers’ behaviors, which provides important policy as 
well as economic implications. Note that the test statistics is asymptotic with respect 
to the length of the estimation window and the number of events. In other words, the 
more the number of events and the larger the estimation window, the more accurate 
the result is. In this paper, ACAR is also interpreted in another term, that is, average 





mean there is only one test that can perform such task. Actually, a variety of test 
statistics are available to conduct it. Brown and Warner (1985) provide a 
comprehensive introduction of appropriate test statistics for measuring the effect of 
the event. Interested readers can also consult Patell (1976) on the tests based on 
standardization.  
4.5 Data Analysis and Empirical Results 
Now we present the empirical results of the event study analysis here. To ensure data 
quality, a data cleansing procedure was performed after the data were collected. The 
process is based on the criterion that there are no missing data for each country under 
investigation. After data cleansing, we can use the standard event study methodology 
to measure the effect of the event. The estimation window is from  to  
and the event window is from 
750 −T 80 −T
70 −T  to 70 +T  (The event day is assumed to be 
).  0T
4.5.1 Event Study Results 
Table 4.6 presents the results that investigate the effect of government enforcement on 
hackers’ behaviors for each individual country after taking into account the difference 
between sampling days and calendar days. In other words, sampling days are used to 
measure the effect of government enforcement, and the event window is 
correspondingly revised to meet this purpose.  
 
The jargon average CAR in finance research is interpreted in another term - average 
enforcement impact, which shows the average difference between the observed 
number of attacks (in the presence of the event) and the predicted number of attacks 
(in the absence of the event) across all events occurring within one specific country. 
As seen from the table, government enforcement has a significant impact against 
hackers’ behaviors by dramatically reducing malicious attacks launched by hackers 
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with the absolute value ranging from 1.13*106 (Netherlands) to 1.60*107 (Spain) and 
p-value varying from 0.0082 (Netherlands) to 0.0000. The effect of government 
enforcement varies from country to country. The impact on Canada, China, Spain, 







CA 3 2005.01.06; 2005.11.17; 2006.01.17. -2.20*106 (0.0000)***
CN 15 2005.03.21; 2005.03.23; 2005.07.11; 
2005.07.12; 2005.10.19; 2005.11.08; 
2005.11.14; 2005.11.15; 2005.11.18; 
2006.02.24; 2006.04.10; 2006.04.15; 
2006.04.22; 2006.04.27; 2006.05.12. 
-1.18*107 (0.0000)***
ES 2 2006.02.07; 2006.04.08. -1.60*107 (0.0000)***
UK 6 2005.01.30; 2005.10.10; 2005.11.05; 
2005.12.30; 2006.01.17; 2006.05.10. 
-2.44*106 (0.0000)***
JP 3 2005.03.25; 2005.04.14; 2005.11.10. -1.36*106 (0.0042)** 
NL 1 2005.10.10. -1.13*106 (0.0082)** 
KR 2 2005.7.12; 2006.05.21. -3.36*106 (0.0000)***
US 17 2005.01.29; 2005.02.25; 2005.03.14; 
2005.10.14; 2005.10.22; 2005.12.30; 
2006.01.28; 2006.04.13; 2006.04.21; 
2006.05.06; 2006.05.09; 2006.05.10; 




*** Significant at the 0.1 percent level (p<0.001) 
** Significant at the 1 percent level (p<0.01) 
* Significant at the 5 percent level (p<0.05) 




(p<0.001), while the impact upon Japan and Netherlands is very statistically 
significant (p<0.01). The fact that the effect of government enforcement for Japan is 
not as remarkable as that for other countries might be accounted for by the following 
reasons: Japanese companies, on average, are relatively slower to establish and 
implement managerial measures, such as employee education and policy clarification, 
since only around 23 percent of them have set up formal information security policies. 
In addition, it seems that most Japanese companies rely too heavily on software such 
as firewalls, anti-virus applications and intrusion detection systems, but neglect what, 
in essence, is the most effective kind of countermeasures, “people measures” also 
known as soft issues (Kunii, 2001) - a point quite consistent with Anderson (1993)’s 
that information security breaches are caused largely by the misinstallation, 
misconfiguration, and mismanagement of people rather than the failure of the 
technology or system itself. Furthermore, for some political reasons, the home pages 
of many Japanese companies are frequently broken into by some organized hackers 
such as a Chinese hacker organization called the Honker Union of China (HUC) 
(Please refer to http://www.cnhonker.com, 2001). And to make matters worse, 
Japanese government fails to effectively impose strict enforcement against those 
hacker groups, which is one of the main reasons for the not-so-remarkable effect of 
government enforcement. Therefore, Japanese government should take appropriate 
measures and exercise further efforts to address its information security from the 
above perspectives, and contributes to the establishment of sound information security. 
Of course, those countries with extremely statistically significant p-values should not 
slacken and should maintain their efforts in addressing their information security 
issues, and continue to take advantage of effective government enforcement to combat 
hacking activities. On the whole, government enforcement proves to be associated 
with significant negative and deterrent effects against the number of attacks 
committed by hackers, which is consistent with our expectations (The term of average 
enforcement impact is negative in sign, and all p-values are significant at least at 1 




Next, the length of the event window is extended to 22 days, which is composed of 7 
pre-event days, one event day, and 14 post-event days. The objective of this research 
is to investigate whether the effect of government enforcement will decay or diminish 
in extent as time goes by. Of course, another possibility is that as the amount of the 
observation days (event window) increases, certain delayed effects of government 
enforcement will take place anew or even become more remarkable, which further 
impacts against hackers’ behaviors. The rationale for using this asymmetric event 
window rather than the orthodox symmetric one is that post-event days tend to capture 
much more important and meaningful information including the impact of the event 
than pre-event days do. The pre-event days might include more “noise” or irrelevant 
information especially with the extension of the event window. Therefore, pre-event 
days should not be considered of the same importance and weight as post-event days. 
Thus, we decide to properly expand the length of the post-event days to 14 days while 
simultaneously maintaining the size of the pre-event window that involves seven days 
in order to eliminate the phenomenon of irrelevant noise information. Table 4.7 
presents the comparisons of the results for the two different sizes of event windows: 
15 days and 22 days, respectively. As can be seen from the table, for Canada, China, 
United Kingdom, Korea, and United States, the effect of government enforcement 
decays dramatically with the increase of the length of the event window, which might 
be explained as follows: Although government enforcement seems to be quite severe 
in these countries as can be seen from the very statistically significant p-values in the 
table, these countries are still subject to heavy hacking activities - due to economic, 
political or other potential reasons - as time passes by. Besides, the decayed effect is 
consistent with human’s common sense and our expectations, and thus desirable. 
However, for countries such as Spain and Netherlands, the effect of government 
enforcement intensifies rather than decays as the event window increases from 15 
days to 22 days, which means that government enforcement has a delayed effect 
against hackers’ behaviors. It might be caused by the fact that the disclosure 
mechanisms of these two countries are not very effective to release enforcement 
announcements to the public, thus rendering people including hackers uninformed of 
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the enforcement cases or informed much later than they should be. As for countries 
like Japan, the effect of government enforcement is influenced by a combination of 
these two forces - decayed effect and delayed effect. And the final outcome is a 
mixture of these two effects with neither one dominating or eliminating the other. In 
addition, some CARs for certain countries change from previously hypothesized 
negative values to positive values, which implies that hackers’ behaviors are basically 
not impacted on those days far away from the event day.  
15-day Event Window 22-day Event Window Country No. of 
Events AEI10 SD10 theta10 p AEI SD theta p 
CA 3 -2.20*106 5.38*105 -4.10 0.0000*** -1.86*106 6.13*105 -3.03 0.0024**
CN 15 -1.18*107 1.05*106 -11.27 0.0000*** -4.66*106 1.22*106 -3.80 0.0001***
ES 2 -1.60*107 1.19*106 -13.48 0.0000*** -3.02*107 1.46*106 -20.69 0.0000***
UK 6 -2.44*106 2.43*105 -10.06 0.0000*** -2.03*106 2.89*105 -7.03 0.0000***
JP 3 -1.36*106 4.75*105 -2.86 0.0042** -1.40*106 5.47*105 -2.58 0.0099**
NL 1 -1.13*106 4.25*105 -2.64 0.0082** -3.01*106 6.03*105 -4.99 0.0000***
KR 2 -3.36*106 5.75*105 -5.85 0.0000*** -9.89*105 6.27*105 -1.58 0.1145 
US 17 -9.40*106 1.47*106 -6.41 0.0000*** -5.54*106 1.81*106 -3.06 0.0022**
*** Significant at the 0.1 percent level (p<0.001) 
** Significant at the 1 percent level (p<0.01) 
* Significant at the 5 percent level (p<0.05) 
Table 4.7: Comparisons between Different Event Windows 
 
In order to further illustrate our results, we plan to measure the magnitude of the 
effect of government enforcement on the number of attacks. The average daily 
number of attacks for each country is calculated by making a summation of the 
number of attacks during the 300 sampling days and then averaging it. After coping 
with the denominator, we will next handle the numerator. Since the average 
                                                        
10 AEI denotes average enforcement impact, while SD represents standard deviation. Theta is a test statistics 
indicating the extent of the effect of government enforcement, which is equal to average enforcement impact 
divided by standard deviation.  
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enforcement impact deals with a window composed of several sampling days, it is 
necessary to “average” the number as follows. Take, the average enforcement impact 
for Canada, for example. Canada has three events with 10, 11, and 11 sampling days, 
respectively, in the 15-day event window. The average sampling days are 
. Then the average enforcement impact is divided by 11, which 
derives the numerator. The magnitude of the effect of government enforcement is 
calculated as follows:  
113/)1111(10 ≈++
%100
attacks ofnumber daily  Average
days sampling Averageimpact / t  enforcemen Average ×  
 
Table 4.8 summarizes the magnitude of the effect of government enforcement for each 
country. As seen from this table, the magnitude of the effect varies dramatically from 
country to country with the largest being 84.66% (Spain) and the smallest being 
10.12% (U.S.). Most of the values are within the range from 19% to 43%, which 
indicates a remarkably negative effect of government enforcement on hackers’ 
behaviors. The result that the magnitude of the effect for U.S. is the lowest among all 
the countries under investigation is beyond our expectations. U.S has always been a 
leader in the development and enforcement of information security legislation to 
promote the general welfare and create a stable information security environment for 
a sound economy. But why does its government enforcement have the slightest impact 
against hackers’ behaviors? The reason might be that U.S. firms and individuals are 
subject to a high chance of security attacks due to some reasons such as economic 
benefits, political revenge, etc., in spite of its strict enforcement against hackers. In 
other words, hackers tend to believe that the benefits of attacking U.S. firms or 
individuals outweigh the corresponding costs, thus it is worthwhile to launch attacks.  
 
Next, we consider the global magnitude of the effect of government enforcement, 
















of the Effect 
of the Event
CA 3 -2.20*106 11 1.03*106 19.42% 
CN 15 -1.18*107 11 3.28*106 32.71% 
ES 2 -1.60*107 10 1.89*106 84.66% 
UK 6 -2.44*106 10 6.95*105 35.11% 
JP 3 -1.36*106 8 7.27*105 23.38% 
NL 1 -1.13*106 7 4.33*105 37.28% 
KR 2 -3.36*106 10 7.91*105 42.48% 
US 17 -9.40*106 10 9.29*106 10.12% 
Table 4.8: The Magnitude of the Effect of Government Enforcement for Each Country 
 
%100
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After some calculation, the result is 28.32%, which means government enforcement 
has a 28.32% deterrent effect on hackers’ behaviors at a global level. Therefore, 
government enforcement proves to be associated with significant negative effects 
against the number of security attacks committed by hackers on a global basis, which 
is quite consistent with our expectations. However, it should be noted that the global 
claim is limited in the sense that the values only takes into consideration eight typical 
countries all over the world. Future researches might consider including more 
countries to further evaluate the validity of the results.  
 
Furthermore, Table 4.9 presents specific values for the CAR on the event day. The 
important property of this table is that it involves both the mean and median abnormal 
returns across all events on the event day . The difference is defined as 0T
MeanAR/MeanAR)   -(MedianAR . As seen from the table, on the event day, both 
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statistics are negative and significant as expected. However, these two values are not 
equal to each other most of the time (Since there are only two events for Spain and 
Korea and one event for Netherlands, their means and medians are necessarily the 
same). As for Japan, the difference is up to 146.42%, which indicates the presence of 
strong outliers that drive the mean to them and away from the rest of the points and it 
might endanger the robustness of the estimators. Fortunately, except that of Japan, the 
difference between mean and median abnormal returns for other countries is within an 
acceptable range with the largest no more than 40%.  
 
CAR (t=0) Canada China Spain United Kingdom
Mean AR -160315 -1178405 -564005 -292033 
Median AR -170472 -932247 -564005 -182928 
Difference(%) 6.34% 20.89% 0% 37.36% 
CAR (t=0) Japan Korea Netherlands United States 
Mean AR -27207 -270756 -1030223 -1118503 
Median AR -67044 -270756 -1030223 -1193126 
Difference(%) 146.42% 0% 0% 6.67% 
Table 4.9: Mean and Median Abnormal Return on the Event Day 
4.5.2 Implications for Theory and Practice 
This study provides important implications for both theory and practice. From the 
theoretical perspective, first of all, this study adapts event study methodology from 
the finance research to the field of information security and successfully employs it to 
investigate the impact of government enforcement against hackers’ behaviors, which 
demonstrates that government enforcement indeed has a significantly negative and 
deterrent effect on hackers’ behaviors as expected. On the one hand, it indicates that 
event study analysis can be successfully extended to research fields in addition to 
finance and accounting, and used to derive desirable results. On the other hand, it 
complements the existing body of research in the area of information security by 
incorporating an important variable - government enforcement - and makes a step 
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towards a more comprehensive model of information security that is useful for policy 
making adopted by the government. In addition, our results can be used to serve as an 
empirical proof of the proposition that hackers’ targeting decreases as the enforcement 
rate increases presented in Png, Tang, and Wang (2006). Our results are also 
somewhat comparable to those found in Hui and Png (2003), which argues that the 
demand for the pirated information products is decreasing as the expected penalty 
increases. The proposition is similar to our viewpoint that as government enforcement 
enhances, the number of security attacks launched by hackers decreases. Chen and 
Png (2003) develop a theoretical model that takes into consideration the interactions 
among government policy, the producer’s business strategy, and users’ choices. Their 
key result is that government policies that center on penalties alone will be socially 
sub-optimal. The result seems to somewhat contradict with our stance, but considering 
the different scenarios, we think it is possible to combine these two seemingly 
contrasting conclusions. Becker (1968) constructs a theoretical economic model to 
measure the optimal public and private policies to combat illegal behaviors. The main 
contribution of his paper is to indicate that the optimal government policy to combat 
illegal behaviors is a matter of the optimal allocation of social resources. Our study 
can follow his lead and conduct empirical analysis to test whether the so-called 
“optimality conditions” hold using real-world data. Future researches can extend our 
study by constructing a more complicated econometric model, basing it on certain 
sophisticated underlying economic model, and collecting more recent data sources to 
better measure the effect of government enforcement on hackers’ behaviors.  
 
From the perspective of practice, our results also provide valuable directions that can 
guide governments to take more strategic and rational actions. The results show that 
government enforcement has a significantly negative impact against hackers’ 
behaviors. The magnitude of its effect varies greatly from country to country within 
the range from 19% to 43% except two countries - Spain (84.66%) and the U.S.A. 
(10.12%). That means U.S.A. should exercise further efforts and take more active 
measures to deter hackers from launching security attacks although it is taking the 
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lead in developing and implementing computer crime laws to promote a sound 
information security environment. In addition, government enforcement has a 
negative 28.32% deterrent effect on hackers’ behaviors at a global level. Therefore, 
the government can properly convict or prosecute hackers in the form of prison terms, 
probation, fines, compulsory community service hours, etc., to deter them from 
committing cyber-crimes if it wants to create a sound information security 
atmosphere.  
4.5.3 Regression Analysis 
The previous event study analysis mainly focuses on measuring the effect of 
government enforcement from the perspective of each individual country. To extend 
the scope of our research, we conduct a regression analysis to evaluate the overall 
effect of government enforcement that takes into account all the countries under 
investigation. In this section, we employ panel data methods to assess the overall 
picture of the effect of government enforcement.  
 
Actually, panel data which have relatively few cross-sections, with variables listed in 
cross-section specific individual series are called “pooled time series, cross-section 
data” in contrast to ordinary panel data with a large number of cross-sectional units 
(QMS, 2004). But, to avoid confusion, these two terms are used interchangeably in 
the following sections. Panel data or longitudinal data typically refer to data 
containing time series observations of the same units (individuals, households, firms, 
etc.). Therefore, observations in panel data generally involve two dimensions - 
cross-sectional dimension, denoted by subscript , and time series dimension, marked 
by subscript t . Two widely used panel data sets in economics are the National 
Longitudinal Surveys of Labor Market Experience (NLS) and the University of 
Michigan’s Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) (Hsiao, 2003). Panel data 
possess several major advantages over traditional pure cross-sectional or pure 
time-series data sets (Hsiao, 1985). The most obvious advantage is that panel data 




the multicollinearity among explanatory variables, thus improving the accuracy and 
efficiency of parameter estimates, and enables the researchers to specify more 
complicated models. In addition, panel data allow the researchers to control for 
individual, unobservable heterogeneity that might cause biases in estimation results. 
The third advantage is that the use of panel data makes it possible to address many 
important economic questions unanswerable by either a cross-section or a time-series 
alone. Finally, panel data might help eliminate or diminish estimation biases. Given 
the above advantages of panel data, it is worthwhile to employ such methods even at 
the cost of more complex model specification, estimation, and data analysis.  
4.5.3.1 Econometric Model  
(A) Model Variables 
The variables in the model are almost the same as those used previously except that 
some independent variables are further classified into smaller groups.  
 
The dependent variable of interest is hackers’ behaviors, which is represented by the 
number of security attacks launched by hackers.  
 
The first independent variable deals with unemployment rate, which is standardized 
and collected on a monthly basis. The second independent variable is government 
enforcement, which is treated as a binary variable, with 1 indicating the presence of 
the event and 0 the absence of the event. To further illustrate the distinctive impact of 
enforcements of different magnitude, government enforcement is divided into two 
categories: (1) Prison enforcement such as prison sentence, imprisonment, etc., 
represented by EJAIL, and (2) Non-prison enforcement such as fines in restitution, 
hours of compulsory community service, deprivation of using the Internet for a 
specified period of time, etc., denoted by ENOTJAIL. Each category is represented by 
an independent binary variable. Since now panel data estimation rather than event 
study methodology is employed, the variable - government enforcement (now two 
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independent categories) - can and should appear in the estimation equation. The third 
independent variable involves the disclosure of vulnerability notes, which are further 
classified into different groups - VDoS, VBUFFER, and VOTHERS - so as to assess 
their respective effects of various vulnerability notes disclosure on hackers’ behaviors.  
(B) Model Form 
Hackers’ 
Behaviors: 









Figure 4.4: Variables Influencing the Hackers’ Behaviors 
 
Econometric Framework 
Given the model in Figure 4.4, using the subscripts  and t  to denote the country 
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where  is the daily number of security attacks launched by the hackers itAttackNo _
across 16 countries and over 300 sampling days,  is a vector of explanatory 
variables constructed from empirical findings that includes  - the monthly 
unemployment rate of country  on day ,  - a binary variable that equals 1 
if prison enforcement exists in country  on day ,  - another binary 







tVDoS  - the number of vulnerability notes caused by DoS attacks for all the countries 
on day t ,  - the number of vulnerability notes caused by Buffer 
Overflow for all the countries on day t , and  - the number of 
vulnerability notes caused by other forms of attacks for all the countries on day . 
The model assumes that there is no reverse causation, which can be verified using 




),,,,,( 654321 βββββββ  are unknown 
parameters to be estimated and itε  is the error term that varies across individual 
countries and over time. The parameter iα  denotes unobservable country specific 
fixed effects - heterogeneity. This parameter controls for individual factors that vary 
across countries but are time invariant within specific countries, which might involve 
lifestyles, traditions, ideology, geography, personal interests and preferences that may 
influence hackers’ behaviors but fail to be captured by the explanatory variables in the 
baseline model.  
 
The data source is exactly the same as that for the event study analysis; therefore, I 
will not elaborate it here.  
4.5.3.2 Empirical Results  
We employ the fixed effects model (FEM) to estimate the coefficients of the model. 
The main advantage of the FEM lies in its relative ease of parameter estimation and 
that the independence of the individual fixed effects from the other explanatory 
variables is not mandatory, e.g., [ ] 0≠⋅ iXE α . The major disadvantage is that it 
requires the estimation of N separate intercept coefficients, which is costly in terms of 
degrees of freedom (Baltagi, 2001). The problem is particularly acute when N is large 
and T is small. However, fortunately, it does not pose a problem to our research, since 
N is 16 (small) and T is 300 (large) in our scenario. Of course, we could also use the 
random effects model (REM) to estimate the coefficients. The main strength of the 
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REM results from its economic use of degrees of freedom in the estimation, thus 
making it more efficient than the FEM. The main weakness of the model is the strict 
assumption that the random effects are independent of the involved explanatory 
variables, e.g., [ ] 0=⋅ iXE α . It is plausible that certain unobservable effects not 
incorporated in the model might be correlated with the independent variables. This 
violation of the assumption may lead to inconsistent results and biases in the β  
vector. Whether to treat the individual effects iα  as fixed or random is no easy 
question to answer, which has generated a heated debate in the biometrics, statistics, 
and econometrics literature (Baltagi, 2001). Generally, the determination can be 
implemented by using a statistical test called Hausman test, which tests for the null 
hypothesis that X and iα  are uncorrelated. If the null hypothesis is rejected indicated 
by a significant difference between the two estimators, it favors the FEM and rejects 
the REM. Otherwise, it is advised to continue to employ the REM.  
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test 
Pool: POOLBASELINE 
Test cross-section random effects 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob 
Cross-section random 0.000000 6 1.0000 
Table 4.10: The Results of the Hausman Test 
 
Table 4.10 presents the outcome of the Hausman test. The p-value (p = 1.000 > 0.05) 
is insignificant, which indicates that the null hypothesis should not be rejected and; 
therefore, REM seems to be more appropriate in this scenario. However, other 
researchers (e.g., Hsiao, 1985, 2003) argue that the result given by the Hausman test is 
exploratory rather than confirmatory and the choice of the FEM over the REM might 
depend on the nature of the particular problem. For instance, if the cross-sectional 
units deal with countries, large companies or industries, it may be more appropriate to 
assume that the unobservable effects are fixed (FEM) and not generated by a random 
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draw from the population. On the other hand, if we are coping with individuals or 
other small entities drawn from a large population, the assumption of REM is more 
reasonable. Since, in our scenario, the cross-sectional units denote countries, we 
should use the FEM. But considering the insignificant p-value derived by the 
Hausman test, we should then use the REM. Therefore, to achieve a delicate balance 
between these two opposite conclusions, I decide to present both results and let the 
readers decide by themselves.  
 
To demonstrate the advantages of the FEM and the REM, another estimation model - 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation - is also presented here. The model is 
as follows:       
ititit Xy εβα ++= '   T., t,N,i ,1.1 LL ==  
 
Table 4.11 presents the outcomes of the FEM, REM, and pooled OLS estimation. As 
seen from Column 2, the FEM derives the best results: The adjusted R-square is 
0.856787, which is quite acceptable. The p-values for the unemployment rate (0 < 
0.01) and vulnerability notes due to other forms of attacks (0.001 < 0.01) are 
extremely statistically significant, and the p-value (0.0481 < 0.05) for prison 
enforcement is very statistically significant. In addition, they have the desirable signs 
as hypothesized. The results show that unemployment rate has an encouraging effect 
on hackers’ behaviors and prison enforcement exerts a deterrent impact against 
hackers’ behaviors. The negative sign of VOTHERS indicates that the disclosure of 
vulnerability notes caused by other forms of attacks provides strong incentives for 
software vendors to release patches as early as possible and improve the security of 
their products, which outweighs the force that hackers use vulnerability notes to 
“reverse-engineer” the process and launch security attacks. Therefore, the outcome is 
a deterrent effect on hackers’ behaviors. However, non-prison enforcement has an 
undesirable positive sign. To matter matters worse, it is statistically significant with a 
wrong sign, which claims that non-prison enforcement actually encourages hackers to 
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engage in hacking activities. One plausible reason might be that non-prison 
enforcement such as fines in restitution, hours of compulsory community service, and 
deprivation of using the Internet for a specified period of time might be considered as 
too light or mild to constitute a real deterrent factor to hackers. As hackers render 
substantial financial losses to the victims due to security breaches, they are expected 
to experience severe punishment which is at least proportional, if not more, to the 
severity of their hacking activities. However, unfortunately, in the field of information  











































Adjusted R2 0.856787 0.813074 0.063851 
F-statistic 1368.165 1100.595 55.55361 
Number of observations 4800 4800 4800 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level (p<0.01), ** Significant at the 5 percent level (p<0.05) 
* Significant at the 10 percent level (p<0.10), The values in the parenthesis are t-values for the 
parameters.  




security, the severity of the punishment is at a low level currently (e.g., Hollinger,  
1991; Michalowski and Pfuhl, 1991). For example, Brett Edward O’Keefe, a hacker, 
who hacked into government and private computers including the U.S. Army and 
NASA and resulted in substantial financial losses within the range of $95,000 to 
$100,000, only faced a negligible 60-day work-release program and 100 hours of 
community service as a result of pleading guilty (The San Diego Union-Tribune, 2nd 
Aug. 2005). It is hard to believe such light non-prison enforcement will have a 
profound deterrent impact against hackers, who might think since legal punishment is 
not severe at all, the benefits of launching hacking activities still outweigh the 
corresponding costs and it is worthwhile continuing to commit hacking - the ultimate 
effect might be a counterproductively encouraging instead of discouraging impact 
against hackers’ behaviors. Of course, whether this tentative explanation is tenable or 
not is itself an issue of empirical analysis and thus entails further investigation. 
However, the fact that the previous hypothesis that it should have a significant 
negative sign later evolves into a significant positive (wrong) sign is, after all, 
outrageous and beyond our wildest expectations, which implies the baseline model 
leaves much to be desired. Later, I will address this problem by slightly modifying the 
estimation procedure.  
 
In addition, VDOS and VBUFFER are not statistically significant because it is 
influenced by two opposing forces: 1) Strong incentives for software vendors to 
release patches as early as possible and improve the security of the products, and 2) 
Hackers use solutions in vulnerability disclosure to “reverse-engineer” the process 
and further commit hacking activities. The result indicates that for vulnerability notes 
due to Denial of Service (DoS) and Buffer Overflow, neither force dominates or 
eliminates the other, thus leading to the insignificant t-values. Another possible 
explanation might be that the classification of vulnerability notes into three groups 
(e.g., DoS, BUFFER, and Others) fails to capture the effect of vulnerability notes on 
hackers’ behaviors - perhaps, the classification is too general to be of much use or 
hackers’ behaviors are indeed not affected much by vulnerabilities due to DoS attacks 
 71
Master Thesis 
and Buffer Overflow.  
 
Column 3 in Table 4.11 presents the results of the REM. On the whole, the results of 
the REM are almost similar to those of the FEM. The p-values for unemployment rate 
(0.0001 < 0.01) and vulnerability notes due to other forms of attacks (0 < 0.01) are 
extremely statistically significant, and the p-value ( 0.100.1194 ≈ ) for prison 
enforcement is nearly statistically significant at the 10% level. The results indicate 
that unemployment rate exerts an encouraging effect on hackers’ behaviors and prison 
enforcement has a deterrent impact against hackers’ behaviors. The negative 
significant sign of VOTHERS indicates that the disclosure of vulnerability notes 
caused by other forms of attacks actually encourages software vendors to address 
information security more seriously and rapidly, which offsets the effect that hackers 
take advantage of the disclosure to launch more security attacks. However, the 
undesirable positive sign of non-prison enforcement similar to that of the FEM seems 
to reject our hypothesis.  
 
Column 4 in Table 4.11 presents the results of pooled OLS estimation. The results are 
quite unsatisfactory: unemployment rate, prison enforcement, and non-prison 
enforcement have the unintended signs, especially all with statistically significant 
p-values. In addition, the adjusted R-square is 0.063851, which is very low and 
unacceptable. The main reason for the poor estimation is that pooled OLS estimation 
austerely assumes the intercepts and slope coefficients are homogeneous across all 
 cross-sections and over all N T  time periods, which discards the temporal 
dimension - “within variation” - and space dimension - “between variation” and 
simply throws away much useful information. Therefore, I will mainly use the FEM 
in the later panel data estimation.  
 
The highlighted items in Table 4.11 indicate the presence of unintended estimation 
results that are contrary to our hypotheses. To remedy this problem, we propose three 
approaches to address this issue. First, the rolling window method is employed. The 
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procedure is described as follows: aggregate the data in the 7-day rolling window and 
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The rationale is that since end-users need some time to fix the patches, it is not likely 
they will patch the vulnerabilities on a daily basis; instead, it may be more reasonable 
to assume that they fix the patches weekly. Therefore, we try to estimate the model 
using a rolling window consisting of 7 days. The second approach is nearly the same 
as the baseline model except that we just extract weekly samples from 300 sampling 
days. For example, we draw the samples with the observation number 1, 8, 15, …, 
295 to assess the weekly effect; therefore, there are 43 observations for each country. 
Third, since the data for all the variables are collected on a daily basis except that the 
data for the variable, unemployment rate, are gathered monthly, because only monthly 
unemployment rate is available. Therefore, it poses the issue of incompatible 
sampling intervals among predictors and response variables, which might compromise 
the validity of the empirical results derived from the model. To address this issue, we 
attempt to collect the data for all the variables, independent or dependent variables, on 
a monthly basis, and then implement the FEM. To be more specific, the data for the 
number of security attacks, vulnerability notes including VDoS, VBuffer, and VOthers 
are aggregated across the whole month. The data for unemployment rate are just left 
unchanged, since it is already at a monthly level. And finally, government 
enforcement including EJAIL and ENOTJAIL is again treated as a binary variable, 
which equals 1 if the corresponding enforcement occurs within the month under 
investigation. One additional advantage of this approach is that it enables the event to 
take place more frequently at the monthly level. It is highly plausible that there are a 
sporadic number of events occurring on a daily basis but quite a few events taking 
place on a monthly basis. The aggregation at the monthly level tends to increase the 
number of value 1’s for the binary enforcement variable, which might increase the 
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validity of the results, since the test statistics is asymptotic with respect to the number 
of events.  



























































Adjusted R2 0.856787 0.903648 0.86593 0.753555 
F-statistic 1368.165 2101.352 212.2945 48.04959 
Number of 
observations 
4800 4704 688 352 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level (p<0.01) 
** Significant at the 5 percent level (p<0.05) 
* Significant at the 10 percent level (p<0.10) 
The values in the parenthesis are t-values for the parameters.  
Table 4.12: The Empirical Results for Four Models Using the FEM 
 
Table 4.12 summarizes the results for the baseline model (Model 1), baseline model 
with a rolling window (Model 2), baseline model with weekly samples (Model 3), and 
baseline model with data aggregated on a monthly basis (Model 4), all of which use 
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the FEM. Note that the number of observations for Model 2 is 4704, since the last six 
rows should not be counted in the rolling window and thus there are 294 entries for 
each country. As seen from this table, Model 3 best addresses the issue of unintended 
positive sign of non-prison enforcement in Model 1, Model 2, and Model 4. In 
addition, the p-value for unemployment rate (0.0001 < 0.01) is extremely statistically 
significant, and the p-value for prison enforcement ( 0.10000.1004 ≈ ) is nearly 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The sign of non-prison enforcement is 
negative as hypothesized, although not significant in the p-value. The adjusted 
R-square is 0.86593, which is quite acceptable. Finally, none of the p-values for 
vulnerability notes (DoS, Buffer Overflow, and other forms of attacks) is statistically 
significant, which can be argued that vulnerability notes have two-fold effects on 
hackers’ behaviors - 1) encouraging software vendors to release patches more rapidly 
and improve the security of their products and 2) simultaneously providing hackers 
with a good opportunity to “reverse-engineer” the process and launch security attacks. 
Actually, the ultimate impact of vulnerability notes on hackers’ behaviors depends on 
the interaction and balances between theses two competing effects. Therefore, Model 
3 is a good alternative to be employed as the ultimate model for panel data estimation.  
Unit Root Test 
Since panel data contains information across countries and over time, the issue of 
stationarity in time-series should be addressed. A time-series is said to be stationary if 
its mean and variance are constant over time and the simple correlation coefficient 
between the two time periods only depends on the length of the lag but not on the 
actual time when the coefficient is calculated. If one or more of these properties are 
not fulfilled, it is referred to as nonstationary. The motivation to the research of such 
question is that if a time series is nonstationary, then it is not possible to generalize the 
results to other time periods, which limits the practical value of such time series 
(Gujarati, 2003). The major negative effect of nonstationarity is spurious correlation 
that tends to inflate adjusted R2 and the t-values of the nonstationary independent 
variables (Studenmund, 2001). A test of assessing stationarity that has been gaining 
popularity in the past few years is the unit root test. Actually, we employ the 
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Dickey-Fuller test in our research to test for a unit root. To run the Dickey-Fuller test, 
the following equation is estimated: ttt YY εββ ++=Δ −110 , and one-sided t-test is run 
with the null hypothesis that 01 =β . If 1β  is significantly less than zero, we can 
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root - nonstationarity. Of course, we can then run 
the Dickey-Fuller test for every variable including independent and dependent 
variables. However, Studenmund (2001) proposes that the presence of nonstationarity 
indicated by the Dickey-Fuller test does not necessitate changing the functional form 
of the model. In other words, before modifying the model, cointegration is first 
employed to check whether it is essential to implement the modification. 
Cointegration involves matching the degree of nonstationarity of the variables in the 
equation to make the disturbance term stationary and frees the equation from any 
spurious correlation. Even if individual variables are not stationary, it is still possible 
for combinations of nonstationary variables to exhibit stationarity - cointegrated. If 
individual variables have unit roots but are cointegrated as a whole, then we can still 
use their original forms (Studenmund, 2001). Therefore, we can directly check the 
residuals of the equations to test for cointegration using the Dickey-Fuller test.  
 
Table 4.13 presents the results of the cointegration of the residuals of the equations. 
The p-values for all the countries are statistically significant, which rejects the null 
hypothesis of unit root and indicates the stationarity of the time-series. Therefore, 
Model 3 does not need to be modified to address the issue of stationarity in panel data 
estimation.  
4.5.4 Event Study Methodology vs. Panel Data Estimation 
In this section, we focus our attention on making comparisons between the results 
derived using event study methodology and panel data estimation and providing some 





Country Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
AU RES_AU(-1) -0.38583 0.113684 -3.39389 0.0016***
BR RES_BR(-1) -0.75104 0.14594 -5.14624 0***
CA RES_CA(-1) -0.58789 0.1899 -3.0958 0.0037***
CN RES_CN(-1) -0.41864 0.119957 -3.48993 0.0012***
DE RES_DE(-1) -0.29086 0.113201 -2.56941 0.0140**
ES RES_ES(-1) -0.36636 0.118041 -3.10365 0.0035***
FR RES_FR(-1) -0.62515 0.143642 -4.35213 0.0001***
GB RES_GB(-1) -0.41267 0.132577 -3.11266 0.0034***
IT RES_IT(-1) -0.46958 0.186668 -2.51561 0.0162**
JP RES_JP(-1) -0.33978 0.142813 -2.37922 0.0225**
KR RES_KR(-1) -0.28268 0.11034 -2.56192 0.0143**
NL RES_NL(-1) -0.55659 0.141803 -3.92512 0.0003***
PL RES_PL(-1) -0.22916 0.087466 -2.62002 0.0124**
SE RES_SE(-1) -0.4678 0.140026 -3.34081 0.0018***
TW RES_TW(-1) -0.50858 0.141067 -3.60527 0.0009***
US RES_US(-1) -0.69643 0.147802 -4.7119 0***
*** Significant at the 1 percent level (p<0.01) 
** Significant at the 5 percent level (p<0.05) 
* Significant at the 10 percent level (p<0.10) 
Table 4.13: The Empirical Results for the Cointegration of the Residuals 
 
On the whole, empirical results derived by means of event study analysis and panel 
data estimation concertedly demonstrate that government enforcement has a 
significantly negative and deterrent effect against hackers’ behaviors, and it is 
worthwhile for governments to remain and enhance enforcement against hackers in 
order to cultivate a sound information security environment. However, there are also 
some discrepancies between empirical results using these two methods. In terms of 
event study methodology, the results are quite satisfactory and desirable. Except for 
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two countries - Japan and Netherlands - that have significant p-values at the 1 percent 
level, the rest of the countries all have extremely significant p-values at the 0.1 
percent level, which indicates a remarkably deterrent effect of government 
enforcement. In comparison, as for the results derived by panel data estimation, prison 
enforcement is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, but non-prison 
enforcement is statistically significant with the undesirable sign. Even after the 
modification of the baseline model, non-prison enforcement is still insignificant even 
if the sign is consistent with our hypothesis, which seems to imply that non-prison 
enforcement does not have a remarkable impact against hackers’ behaviors. Therefore, 
there seems to be some discrepancies between the empirical results using different 
approaches. After further thoughts, some preliminary explanations are presented to 
account for the reason why the results using two distinct approaches are, to some 
extent, inconsistent with each other.  
z Event study methodology is a powerful approach that has the capability to isolate 
the impact of the event within a given period of time. The ability arises through 
the construction of event window and researchers measure the effect of the event 
only within the range of this specified event window. Generally, reverberations of 
the event are still being felt during the relatively small event window compared 
with the whole time line, which can effectively capture the impact of the event. 
By contrast, panel data estimation just treats the event of interest as an ordinary 
binary variable no different from other independent variables. It does not 
distinguish the differences among event window, estimation window, and other 
sampling days, and just consider all the sampling days completely the same. The 
effect of the event might dilute or decay over time due to the indiscriminate 
handling of sampling days, which fails to capture the effect of the event that may, 
as a matter of fact, exist. Thus, event study methodology is capable of deriving 
more statistically significant p-values and capturing the impact of the event more 
effectively and accurately than panel data estimation.  
z Due to some objective reasons related to event study methodology itself, it cannot 
investigate the effect of two events simultaneously, which is the reason why 
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government enforcement is treated as a whole. But this variable is categorized 
into two groups - prison and non-prison enforcement - in panel data estimation. It 
is highly possible that even though one part of enforcement is significant and the 
other part is insignificant, the final combination of these two parts as a whole still 
exhibits significant p-values. Actually, after observing the data for government 
enforcement, more than 90% belongs to the category of prison enforcement, 
which shows significant p-values in panel data estimation. Thus, both of the 
inconsistent results might be considered reasonable in the sense that they just 
explore the problem from different perspectives but, in essence, might reveal the 
same answer. Anyway, it is just a tentative explanation of the reason of the 
inconsistent results. Whether it is valid or not should be examined more carefully 
in later researches.  
z The inconsistency of the results might be caused by different scopes and 
applicability of the two approaches. Event study methodology measures the effect 
of government enforcement at an individual country level with different p-values 
for each country, while panel data estimation examines the effect of the event at a 
global level with the same p-value for all the countries. In this sense, it is 
relatively more difficult to derive statistically significant p-values using panel 
data estimation, and the empirical results dealing with these two different scopes 
are hard or impossible to make comparisons between each other.  
z It seems that event study methodology is less sensitive to the selection of 
independent variables. The model might suffer from the limitations of omission 
of relevant variables or inclusion of irrelevant variables. If that is the case, then 
the validity of the results derived using either of these two approaches is bound to 
be compromised. However, event study methodology still exhibits excellent 
empirical results with significant p-values, while panel data estimation is 
incapable of deriving significant p-values for some variables, which indicates the 
latter approach might be highly sensitive to the selection of explanatory variables.  
 
On the whole, event study methodology is a little more superior to panel data 
 79
Master Thesis 
estimation in our setting in the sense that it is able to isolate the impact of the event 
within a given period of time and, more importantly, derive more desirable empirical 
results and capture the impact of the event more effectively. Of course, it does not 
mean panel data estimation is not useful or worthwhile in this research at all. It also 
has its own advantages and applicability: e.g., it can measure the effect of government 
enforcement at a global level that takes into account all the countries under 
investigation. That is the reason why we take the time and efforts to conduct a 
complementary empirical analysis using panel data estimation to better illustrate the 
results given by event study methodology.  
4.6 Limitations and Future Research 
Notwithstanding the systematic and concerted efforts I have invested in this study, 
there are still some limitations that may undermine the inference power of my 
research findings as follows:  
 
First, data for the dependent variable - the number of attacks - are collected from the 
Internet Storm Center (ISC), which only lists countries that are among the top 20 in 
the world attacked by hackers. That means the results derived are mainly applicable to 
“top hacked” countries but may not apply to “less hacked” ones. The main reason is 
due to the biased sample selection. In addition, the number of events for some 
countries is quite limited (e.g., there is only 1 event for Netherlands), which might 
pose a threat to the validity of the final results, since the z test statistics in this 
scenario is asymptotic with respect to the number of events. Future researches can use 
more sufficient and recent data to include both “top hacked” and “less hacked” 
countries and try to find more events for each country, thus producing a more 
complete picture of security attacks throughout the world.  
 
Second, government enforcement in the event study analysis is assumed to be 
homogeneous (exogenous), which does not vary in the level of seriousness. However, 
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in reality, a mere $500 fine may provide entirely different implications to hackers 
compared with a ten-year imprisonment punishment. But, event study methodology in 
this scenario cannot effectively distinguish the nature of government enforcement 
such as prison and non-prison punishment simply due to the method itself. To address 
this problem, we have conducted a complementary regression analysis that 
distinguishes between prison and non-prison enforcement by using two binary 
variables in the estimation equation - each one for the respective punishment to 
evaluate the overall effect of government enforcement that takes into account all the 
countries under consideration rather than the individual effect at the country level 
derived using event study methodology. However, the result is not perfectly 
satisfactory in the sense that the p-value for non-prison enforcement is not statistically 
significant. Future researches can try to classify government enforcement into smaller 
groups that vary in the level of seriousness.  
 
Third, in this paper, we only categorize vulnerabilities into three major groups: 
vulnerabilities caused by DoS, Buffer Overflow, and other forms of security attacks. 
An important direction for future work is to make a further classification into smaller 
groups by subdividing vulnerabilities caused by other forms of security attacks. 
Although it requires more variables to be estimated and more data to be collected, it 
will provide us with a more comprehensive view of the respective effect of 
vulnerability notes on hackers’ behaviors, which is quite desirable and worthwhile the 
extra efforts.  
 
Fourth, the statistical insignificance of non-prison enforcement and some vulnerability 
notes might be caused by the omission of relevant variables. Since the omission of 
relevant variables leads to biased estimates of the parameters and inclusion of 
irrelevant attributes only causes inefficient - but still unbiased - estimates, it is 
advisable to include the irrelevant variables rather than exclude the relevant ones. 
Further endeavors may incorporate some seemly relevant variables such as GDP, the 
installed base of internet users for each country, etc., to better assess the relationships 
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between variables. However, as more explanatory variables are included, they may be 
correlated with the error terms or other independent variables, or may contain 
measurement errors, thus producing biased and inconsistent estimates. In that case, we 
have to identify instrumental variables and employ the two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
approach to estimate the parameters. Of course, it poses a major challenge to find an 
appropriate instrumental variable that is highly correlated with the model’s 
explanatory variables but uncorrelated with the error term. Sometimes, the procedure 
of identification itself is an art rather than a science.  
 
Finally, our paper mainly investigates the effect of external factors on hackers’ 
behaviors from one perspective - government enforcement. A meaningful extension of 
the research involves conducting a study from an internal perspective that measures 
the impact of users’ behaviors against hacking activities. Future researches can look 
for data sources on users’ precautions, e.g., the number of downloads of patches from 
Microsoft, CERT/CC, SecurityFocus, etc., and subsequently examine the impact 
against hackers’ behaviors. Of course, a major challenge is to acquire sufficient and 
high-quality data on users’ behaviors. To the best of our knowledge, the best source of 
information and data on users’ behaviors are the AOL/NCSA Online Safety Study 
(Png, Tang, and Wang, 2006). However, the insufficiency of the data, which is 
collected only twice - in 2004 and 2005, severely compromises its application to the 
panel data estimation. In addition, due to the shortage of data, we could also consider 










Chapter 5 Conclusions 
In this paper, a complete literature review of the background of, barriers to, and 
traditional measures of information security is presented to serve as a solid foundation 
for further research.  
 
Information security background is illustrated with a lot of figures and statistics 
collected from various sources. The participants in this field involve four groups of 
agents that interact with each other - hackers, end-users, software vendors, and 
security specialists such as CERT/CC. The barriers to sound information security 
environment are attributable to insufficient incentives that are further categorized into 
four classes, namely negative network externalities, liability assignment, no accurate 
measures of information security, and other barriers to information security, with 
appeal for urgent actions to properly align economic incentives to address this 
problem.  
 
An extensive literature review points out three main directions of research endeavor in 
the field of information security, that is, technological approaches, behavioral aspects, 
and economic approaches to information security. Although technical methods might 
be the easiest for the organizations to implement and centrally control, it is by no 
means the most effective (Boss, 2005). As for behavioral approaches, Straub (1990) 
suggests that behavioral solutions to information security might be more effective 
than traditional technological ones. However, behavioral ways also face several 
problems such as generally auxiliary to technical solutions and only concentrating on 
“either the organization level or management level of effective control design” (Chin, 
1999; Rees et al, 2003). Therefore, economic approaches can be employed to address 
the issue of information security and should play an active role in this field to better 
align incentives to establish a sound information security environment (Anderson, 
2001; Varian, 2000). On the whole, economic methods to information security are 
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further classified into five main streams of research directions, that is, strategic 
interactions between hackers and end-users, software vulnerability disclosure and 
patch policies, optimal investment in information security, liability assignment and 
cyberinsurance, and evaluations of information security technologies. Unfortunately, 
however, nearly no papers, to the best of our knowledge, have focused on the impact 
of government enforcement on hackers’ behaviors.  
 
To address this problem, this study makes a meaningful attempt to investigate the 
effect of government enforcement against hackers’ behaviors using event study 
methodology. Our results demonstrate that government enforcement has a 
significantly negative and deterrent impact against hackers’ behaviors by dramatically 
reducing the number of security attacks launched. The magnitude of the effect of 
government enforcement varies dramatically from country to country within the range 
from 19% to 43% except two countries - Spain (84.66%) and the U.S. (10.12%), 
which indicates a remarkably negative effect of government enforcement on the 
number of attacks. In addition, government enforcement has a negative 28.32% 
deterrent effect on hackers’ behaviors at a global level. Furthermore, the results given 
by panel data estimation using the fixed effects model demonstrate that government 
enforcement especially prison enforcement dramatically influences hackers’ behaviors. 
Therefore, government enforcement proves to be associated with significant negative 
effects against the number of security attacks committed by hackers either for an 
individual country or on a global basis, which is quite consistent with our 
expectations.  
 
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:  
z Event study methodology can be successfully extended to the field of information 
security in addition to the finance and accounting area, and can be used to derive 
useful results.  
z It complements the existing stream of research in the realm of information 
security by including an important yet untouched variable - government 
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enforcement - and helps, to some extent, to establish a more sophisticated model 
of information security that provides important policy as well as economic 
implications.  
z Our results can be used to serve as empirical proofs of some viewpoints proposed 
by other researchers.  
z This study distinguishes between sampling days and calendar days by redefining 
the event window and adjusting the subsequent procedures to properly compute 
CARs and corresponding variance, which extends the application of event study 
analysis to this new scenario.  
z The research measures the magnitude of the effect of government enforcement for 
each individual country as well as at a global level.  
z Our results provide important implications that can guide governments to better 
address the problem of enforcement against hackers and help to create a sound 
information security environment. 
 
Although we have conducted a relatively complete literature review of the field of 
information security and performed meaningful empirical studies using event study 
methodology and panel data estimation, we still think there are a great number of 
opportunities as well as challenges in this thriving area, especially considering 
organizations’ ever-increasing dependence on information systems for operational, 
strategic, and e-commerce activities in the current ICE Age. Information security is a 
nascent, dynamic, and rapidly-developing field, which will be even more promising 
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A: List of Countries’ Abbreviation 
Abbreviation Full Name Abbreviation Full Name 
AU Australia BR Brazil 
CA Canada CN China 
DE Germany ES Spain 
FR France GB United Kingdom 
IT Italy JP Japan 
KR Korea NL Netherlands 
PL Poland SE Sweden 
TW Taiwan US United States 
Table A: Abbreviations of Countries Investigated 
B: The Detailed List of Events 
Country Event Date Event Description Source 
2005.01.06  9 months probation National Post 
2005.11.17 Suspended from school for 
30 days and is facing an 
expulsion hearing 
The Toronto Star 
CA 
2006.01.17 3 years and 9 months in jail Birmingham Post 
2005.03.21 a token fine of 1 RMB http://www.315safe.com
2005.03.23 Sentenced to 3 to 4 years in 
prison and fines 
China Youth Daily 
2005.07.11 Arrested BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 
CN 
2005.07.12 Sentenced to 3 years in 





2005.10.19 Arrested South China Morning Post 
2005.11.08 Arrested and accused South China Morning Post 
2005.11.14 Arrested Xinhua News Agency 
2005.11.15 Conviction of theft China Daily 




2006.04.10 Not punished just warning South China Morning Post 
2006.04.15 Arrested and being 
sentenced 
Xinhua News Agency 
2006.04.22 Sentenced to 1 year in jail Xinhua News Agency 
2006.04.27 Arrested Xinhua News Agency 
2006.05.12 Sentenced to 4 to 6 months 
in jail 
Shanghai Evening Post 
2006.02.07  2 years in jail M2 Presswire ES 
2006.04.08 up to 40 years in jail Agence France Presse 
2005.01.30   The Independent 
2005.10.10 Found guilty and fined 
£400 
Leicester Mercury 
2005.11.05 Sent to jail The Northern Echo 
2005.12.30 up to 10 years in jail The Daily Telegraph 




2006.05.10 Extradited to and convicted 
in the US, up to 50 years in 
jail 
Press Association Newswire 
JP 2005.03.25  an 8-month prison 
sentence, but suspended for 
3 years 
BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 
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2005.04.14 Being investigated http://www.chinanews.com.cn
2005.11.10 Arrested Kyodo News 
NL 2005.10.10 Arrested and convicted Xinhua News Agency 
2005.7.12   Arrested http://www.sunm.netKR 
2006.05.21 Arrested http://www.ccidnet.com
2005.01.29  18 months in prison The Commercial Appeal  
2005.02.25 Suspended sentence Northern Territory 
News/Sunday Territorian 
2005.03.14 6 months in jail MIS New Zealand 
2005.10.14 a maximum penalty of 5 
years imprisonment and a 
$250,000 fine 
Vancouver Sun 
2005.10.22 Sentenced to 7 months Rocky Mountain News 
2005.12.30 up to 10 years in jail The Daily Telegraph 
2006.01.28 2 years in prison Calgary Herald 
2006.04.13  2 years’ probation and 200 
hours of community 
service 
The Courier-Mail 
2006.04.21 up to 10 years in federal 
prison 
http://www.silicon.com
2006.05.06 1 year of probation and 
ordered to pay $7,427 in 
restitution 
The News Tribune 
2006.05.09 10 years in prison CMP TechWeb 
2006.05.10 5 years in federal prison Associated Press Newswires 
2006.05.11 3 years of imprisonment Ukrainian National News 
Agency 
2006.05.16 4 years and 9 months in jail The Gold Coast Bulletin 
US 
2006.05.25 Prison time CMP TechWeb 
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2006.06.08 up to 30 years in prison 
and reimbursed his former 
employer 
The Independent 
2006.06.09 20 years in prison and a 
$250,000 fine 
VNUNet United Kingdom 
Table B: The Detailed List of Events for the Eight Countries under Investigation 
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